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ABSTRACT 
Present study aims to analyze in a comparaiive perspective. 
Kenan Evren's and Turgut Özal's conceptualizations of secularism. 
beaı-ing in mind the nature of secularism and the role of religion in 
the Turkish polity have changed significantly in the 1 980s and the 
early 1990s. For Evren, secularism is not only a guarantee of the 
religious freedam and conscience but also it protects Turkish 
national unity. But Özal puts an emphasis on the freedam side of 
secularism and on the protection of the rights of pious Muslims. 
As a paraBel development to the saftening of the Kemalist 
secularism in the !980s, Isiarn seems to have a function of civil 
religion for both Evren and Özal but with the difference that while 
the former emphasizes the moral side of Islam, the latter considers 
Islam as a ci\ril societal mntter and tries to harmanize religious 
values with democratic political Yalues. The study is also intended to 
show the influence of Ziya Gökalp's system of thought to both 
Evren's and Özal's conceptualization of secularism. 
Jll 
ÖZET 
Mevcut çalışma, Kenan Evren ve Turgut Özal'ın laiklik anlay1şlarını, 
ı 980 lerde ve ı 990 ların başında Türk siyasasında laikliğin yapısının 
ve dinin rolünün önemli ölçüde değiştiğini göz önünde bulundurarak 
karşılaştırmalı bir şekilde analiz etmeyi hedeflemektedir. E\Ten'e göre 
laiklik sadece din ve vicdan hürriyetinin garantisi olmakla kalmaz 
aynı zamanda Türk milli bütünlüğünü muhafaza eder. Özal ise 
laikliğin hürriyet yanına ve dindarların haklarının korunmasına 
vurgu yapar. 
Kemalist laikliğin 1980'lerde :yumuşamasına paralel bir 
gelişme olarak, Evren ve Özal için İslam uygar din ( ci\ril religion) 
fonksiyonunu üstlenmiş görünmektedir şu farkla ki: E\Ten İslamın 
ahlaki (moral) yanını vurgularken Özal islamı sivil/toplumsal bir 
mesele olarak ele alır ve dini değerlerle demokratik siyasal değerleri 
uyumlu hale getirmeye çalışmaktadır. Çalışma Ziya Gökalp'in 
düşünce sisteminin Evren ve Özal'ın laiklik anlayışlanndaki etkisini 
de gösterıneyi amaçlamaktadır. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Secularism as one of the most controversial issues of the modern 
Turkish politics, has changed significantly since its acceptance as a 
structural requirement of modernization process in the Ottoman 
Empire. The secularization process in the Ottoman times was in the 
directian of bifurcation of religion and state. The founders of the 
Turkish Republic had a "traditional-versus-modern" type of 
approach, equating modernization with \Vesternization and took 
religion as an impediment to change and regnrded the dualism of the 
Iate Ottoman times as unvwrkable. For the Kemalists, religion was 
not supposed to have even the function of "civil religion" for the 
modern Turkish polity. 
Transition to demecratic politics inevitably brought a 
ınoderation in the understanding of secularism and utilization of 
religion for eleeteral consideration. \Vith the moderation of 
secularism, Turkish polity has witnessed a revival of religion as a 
political input in the Iate l940s. With the emergence of the National 
Salvation Party religion no longer was a solely a matter of individual 
concern, it was a political factor that should have a considerable 
influence on the political arena, performing a function of checks and 
balance. The utilization of religion by the military regime (1980-1983) 
was an integral part of the project that aimed at creating a new 
system of ethics in the post-1980 Turkish polity. 
ı 
In the first clwpter, 1 explain the related concepts of 
secularism, laicism and byzantinism and the histoı-ical bach:ground 
of the Turkish experience with secularism in order to inaugurate the 
reader to the theoretical and histoı-ical framework for this study. 
In the second chapter, I study Evren's notion of secularism. 
his attitude towards religion and religious groups, reminding that 
Evren's conceptualization of secularism is discussed without 
differentiating the period of his leadership of the military regime and 
his presidency. The only difference to be noted is his hardening 
attitude towards religious groups and his active participation in the 
debate of Islamic state. 
In the third chapter, I study Özal's notion of secularism. his 
liberal attitude towards relig:ion. nameıy 1iL:era1 concept of ci\il 
religion and his tolerance and utilization of rdigious groups. Of 
course Özal puts more emphasis on the liberal concepLualization of 
secularism during his presideney rather than his prime ministry. 
The final chapter is to briefly assess and compare Evren's 
and Özal's conceptualizations of secularism \:Vith a special reference 
to Mustafa 1\emal's notion of secularism. This chapter also takes Ziya 
Gökalp's system of thought as apoint of reference in the comparison 
of Evren's and Özal' s conceptualizations of secularism. 
2 
CHAPTER I 
THE TURKJSH SECULARJSM : A HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTNE 
Secularism is one of the most controversial issues in Turltish 
politics. Turkey from its de facto acceptance of secularism in the 
Tanzimat Period onwards has come to \vitness an understanding of 
the principle of secularism, the nature of which has been subject to 
change by time. The present chapter is aimed at analyzing the 
Turkish experience of secularism with he assumption that it is the 
relations. the interactions between the state and religion. which have 
deterınined the nature of secularism and such interactions changed 
significantly in the last 150 years. 
Before discussing the Turkish experience of secularisın it 
ınight be useful to give defınitions of related concepts such as 
laicism, secularism and byzantinism. 
l.l Concepts 
Laicism, which derives from the Greek "laos" ( people) and "laikos'' 
(lay), was a concept which emerged from French constitutional 
practice in the nineteenth century. It referred to the necessity that 
the state refrain from lending its positive support to any one religious 
denomination. It was considered to have been fully achieved in 
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Franee in ı 905 with the definitive separation of church and state 
(Mardin. 1981: ı 91 ). In Turkey, as Mardin (1981: ı 9 ı} correcily 
observes that laicism amounted to more than the official 
disestablishment of religion since Muslims did not dispose of an 
autonomous religious institutions such as the Catbolic Church 
which would carry its religious functions independently of the state . 
Secularism was derived from the Latin "saeculum" which 
meant "age" or "generation." Secularism is an ethical system founded 
on the principles of natural morality and independent of revealed 
religion or supernaturalism. Another definition is that secularization 
refers to a displacement of religious beliefs, ritual and sense of 
community from the moral life of society (The Social Science 
Encyclopedia, ı 985:737). Secularism also embodies the spirit of 
reasoned inquiry: a sustained effort to construct a rational picture of 
the universe on the basis of scientifically established knowledge. In 
short, in Ergil's terms : "secularism isa revolt against theological and 
metaphysical absolutes and universals, the same trend may be 
charted in the attitudes toward social and political institutions." 
(Ergil : 1) 
Although there has been a disagreement on the distinction 
between laicism and secularism. it might be useful to use Berkes' 
conceptualization. According to Berkes (1964:5), while the underlying 
emphasis in the word secularism is on the idea of worldliness, the 
term Jaicism emphasizes the distinction of laity from the clergy. Both 
tenns, however refer to two aspects of the same thing. They were 
used in connection with the problems of d uality, opposition or 
separation of church and state. Secularization or laicization which 
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are the same thing in his mind. meant the transformatian of persons. 
offices, properties, institutions, or matters of an ecclesiastical or 
spiritual character to a lay or \Vorldly position. On the other hand 
Turkish secularism (laicism) is not only a Iegal-institutional 
separation between religion and state but is also a fundamentally 
rationalist and positivist attitude toward life and a non-religious way 
of defining the basis of a political community. Thus it would be more 
appropriate to employ secularism rather than laicism in explaining 
the Turkish experience with secularism. 
The basic conflict in secularism in a non-Christian society is 
not necessarily between religion and the world as is the case in 
Christian experience. The conflict is often bet\veen the forces of 
tradition which tend to promote the damination of religion, and the 
forces of change. Such a struggle can take place in a society where 
there is no organized church like that of Turkey, the core of iradition 
in Muslim societies is Islam which is challenged by the various forces 
of modern civilization (Berkes, ı 964: 6; İnalcık, ı 969: 467). In fact. 
secularism in the Ottoman Empire emerged as a structural 
requirement of modernization process. 
In Islam, there is no distinction between religion and state. 
Religion and state are believed to be fused together. Religion is 
considered as the essence of the state and the state is conceived as 
the embodiment of religion. That is the reason for the persistence of 
religious question in Turkish politics more than a half century after 
the formal separation of religion and state. Islam is something more 
than a religious belief system. In western world, religion is a 
compartment of life reserved for certain matters and separate from 
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other spheres of life. An attentive look at the history of Islam may 
easily recognize this nature of Islamic theology in the e\·olution of the 
relationships between political and religious institutions. The 
Khawarij and the Shiite sects are the final outcome of the 
interactions between politics and theology in the setting of an Islaınic 
state. Hen ce, each member of the Islamic community ( umına) is both 
a religious anda political man. As Smith (quoted in Toprak, 1981:20) 
points out, the relationship between the religious and political 
institutions in a society is not only determined by the histoncal 
circumstances but is also dependent on the eA.i.ent to which the 
theology as well as the organization of a particular religion 
encourages its involvement in political activity. In his classifıcation of 
major religions of the \Vorld, "church religions" and "organic 
religions", he regards Islam as an organic religion which does not 
have a well-established church with a separate identity from the rest 
of society and is merged with the social system. Seen in this light, 
the absence of an autonomous religious organization in traditional 
Muslim societies including the Ottoman Empire, has constituted a 
major difficulty in the distinctions between religion and the social 
system. Such a blurring distinction between religion and social 
system facilitates, as it is discussed in Chapter 4, the changes in the 
role of religion in the modern Turkish polity. 
In classical Arabic as well as in Ottoman Turkish, Lewis 
(1988:2) states there are no pairs ofwords corresponding to spiritual 
and temporal, lay and ecclesiastical (1 }, religious and secular. It was 
not until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and then under the 
influence ofWestern ideas and institutions that new words are found 
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first in Turkish and then in Arabic to express the idea of secular (2). 
One may therefore argue that secularization in a Muslim country 
means a withdrawal, in any compartment of life, from the 
jurisdiciion of the religious authority. 
Another related concept is Byzantinism which refers to a 
system where the state has the control over the religion as the latter 
is made subservient to the former. It follows that byzantinism in this 
sense is just the opposite of theocracy- a system where religion 
governs (Bulaç, 1994: 68; Selami, 1976:25). 
For analytical purposes the development of secularism in 
Turkey may be divided into two eras. the Ottoman and the 
Republican era. 
1.2 The Ottoman Era 
The Ottoman state was the embodiment of Islam as the unity of 
religion and state found its expressian in the term din-u-devlet. 
(Berkes, 1969: 9-10; Mardin, 1992a: 117; Toprak, 1981: 26). The 
Islamic nature of the state was consolidated and formalized with of 
the title of Caliph self claimed by Sultan Selim. From then on the 
Ottoman Sultan was not only represented the highest temporal 
authority on Muslim territories, but also personifıed the umma in 
himself. He was thus entrusted with the task of carrying out the 
requirements of Shariah (Islamic canon law). His own secular 
directives, Kanunnames, had necessarily to be in compliance with 
the provisions of Shariah. The Sultan-Caliph in applying Shariah 
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and determining the compatibility of his decrees with Islam was 
assisted by the Sheikh-ul-Jslam. 
Despite this Islamic nature of the state, ulenıa (religious 
dergy) did not constitute an autonomous organization from the state. 
They were much more clearly integrated \vith the apparatus of the 
s ta te. As Mardin (ı 98 ı: ı 94) tells, through their control of education. 
of the judiciary and of the administrative network, ulema acted as 
agents of the state and indirectly ensured the state's control of social 
life. The Empire was also witnessed the institutionalization of the so 
called adab tradition, that is, a secular and state oriented tradition 
according to which secular rule was based on the measuring rods of 
"necessity" and "reason" (Heper, ı985:5). Some theoreticians of the 
Ottoman Empire can link the secular principle of the Ottoman state 
in the first place to the bureaucratic tradition of Middle Eastern 
Empires going back to the ancient Iranian empires (lnakik, ı969: 
438; Mardin, ı 992a: ı 66). In the second place it is related to Central 
Asiatic Turkish concept of state which cherished state authority 
above everything else and identifıed the state with the toru, the law 
of the state. In fact, the Ottoman bureaucrat saw his duty as the 
preservation of the state, and the idea of the supreme interest of 
state paved the way for secular legislation outside the jurisdiction of 
Sharialı (4). It should be added that when the Ottomans fully realized 
the eA.1:ent of Western supremacy in the eighteenth century, the 
küttab (bureaucrats) were given the highest positions of authority. 
Reşid Pasha who opened the reformist era called the Tanzinıat 
together with its able followers in ı839 were all küttab (lnalcik, 
ı969:440). So that the prestige and position of the ulenıa were 
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undermined by the dominat.ion of the bureaucrats. The ızlenıa were 
progressively eased out of the central process of decision making. 
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, kültab were gradually to 
be denied all but marginal roles in the administration, the judiciary 
and the educational system (Mardin, 1981: 196}. 
Beginning in the seventeenth century and continuing up 
until its demise, secularization policies in the Ottoman times were 
initiated at a time when the European powers arisen as a result of 
their advance in scientific and technical areas. Second secularization 
policies occurred as a result of the revival of the adab iradition in its 
most secular forms after Mahmut ll, now recognizing reason as the 
sole eriterian in promulgating policy and placing emphasis on 
enlightenment and education (Heper, 1985:45). The notion of reform 
was defined in terms of a process of \Vesternization involved an 
unpronounced acceptance of secularism. As the concern here is 
more with the nineteenth century secularizing orientation, a brief 
account of secularization policies is given below. 
1.2.1 The Tanzimat Period 
The Tanzimat period began with Hatt-i Hünıayun of Güllıane and 
ended with the proclamation of the First Ottoman Constitution. 
Kanun-i Esasi brought some new, by their very nature, secular 
regulations. The regulations originated in the Sublime Port as some 
specific administrative, financial, legal and educational policies. 
These reform s as Mardin ( 198 ı: ı 97) argues, were the consequence of 
the characteristic attitude of Ottoman secular bureaucracy in 
matters which concerned the restaration of the power of the state i. e. 
9 
if Western institutions could rejuvenate the state, they would be 
adopted. Vhth Tanzimat Reformation, the Otioman state accepted 
that society was made up of equal Ottoman citizens. The creation of 
an Ottoman citizenship meant that the muslims ceased to be the 
Millet-i Hakinıe, the ruling or dominant nation (Mardin, 1991:13-19). 
Many of the privileges which had previously been granted to the 
Muslim population were abolished while similar ones previously 
given under various edicts at various times to the non-Muslim 
population on either a religious or a seetarian basis were reviewed 
and their validity was confirmed. Although the Tanzimat Reforms 
had declared loyalty to the Shariah, it also promulgated some new 
laws which reduced the significance of religious institutions in the 
field of law, education and administration. 
Secularization in the legal proceedings in the period included 
efforts to codify law (to establish legal codes that were \Vritten and 
distinguishable from religious provisions) and to establish secular 
courts. So me of these codes were domestic (the Lan d Code of l 858 
and the Mecelle), while others were extracted from European, most 
notably from French legal systems (the Commercial Code, the Penal 
Code, and the Code of Penal and Legal Procedure). In adopting such 
codes, Shariah continued to be the measuring rod, those deemed 
anti-Shar'i were rejected. As Toprak (1981: 31) points out: "During 
the Tanzimat and the following periods, a number of secular codes 
were enacted in the fields of commercial, penal and civil law that 
supplemented the religious ones. At the same time, a paraHel was 
made to establish secular courts where the new codes would be 
applied. Whereas the Shariah were left under the jurisdiction of the 
lO 
Sheikh-ul-Islam (except in the 1917-1920 period when they were tied 
to the Ministry of Justice)." 
The Tanzimat Period added new secular schools to those that 
had been created in the first half of the eighteenth century beside the 
nıedreses: A new school, the School of Administration (Mülkiye) and 
the Rüşd~ve were the cornerstone of the Tanzimat' s policy for training 
secular cadres who will promote secularization policies in the 
following years. Although the emergence of a dualistic structure in 
law, education and administration may be criticized as one of the 
major weaknesses of the Tanzimat reformation, as Mardin (1990: 182) 
correctly argues the success of it in saving judiciary and educational 
institutions from the monopoly of the ulema and in creating new 
secular institutions should not be underestimated. These 
developments were the crucial steps taken towards further 
secularization in the Ottoman state . 
Secularization of the Tanzimat was in the direction of 
bifurcation, not separation of religion and state as Berkes (1964: 
480) underlies: 
Secularization throughout the Tanzimat (and 
Meşrutiyet) period(s), regarding the separation of 
religion and state, was not in the directian of the 
severance of ties between two distinct spheres of 
life belonging to two distinct authorities and 
institutions. Rather it was one of bifurcating a 
whole, through a series of changes in one sector 
of life while another sector of life (with which 
religion identified itself) remained static and lost 
its superiority over the other and its institutional 
support (Khilafat and Shariah). 
ll 
ı .2.2 The Constiiution of ı 876 
The significance of /{anun-i Esasi, the first constitution in Islamic 
histoıy is that the Tanzimat reforms were constitutionalized, though 
the Constitution did not represent progress in the Tanzimats 
secularism. In fact, the state which Kanun-i Esasi had set up was 
neither secular nor religious. The functioning of state had been made 
dependent on Kanun-i Esasi created by human rationality. not based 
directly on Shariah, in this sense, Kanun-i Esasi was secular. On the 
other hand, it became the legal document for the rejection of the idea 
of a secular state and the legal affirmation of the Islamic aspect of 
the Turkish state. Articles 3,4,5 and ı3 placed the ruler's temporal 
powers (which were not restricted by the Constitution) on the basis of 
a religious legitimacy. Islam was declared to be the official religion of 
the state (Article 2); the Sultan-Caliph was defined both as the head 
of state and the head ofreligion (Article 4); and according to Article 7, 
he was charged with the task of executing the Alıkanı-i Shariyya 
Uudgments or provisions of Islam); and according to Article 64 the 
Ayan Meclisi (Chamber of Notables) was charged with the task of 
refusing to approve the drafts that stood in contradiction with umur-
u diniyya (religious precepts) (Başgil, ı982: 183). 
It follows that Islam continued to be "an above law" to the 
e:h.'tent it had been prior to ı 876, but it increasingly lost i ts capacity 
to shape directly policies after that date. 
ı2 
ı .2.3 The Hamidian Times 
Interestingly enough, the Sultan Hamid's period had been an 
amalgamation of secular and Islamist policies \Vith a peculiar 
emphasis on secular ones. Although the ideology of the Hamidian 
period was pan-Islamisi (6) calling on all the Muslims of the Empire 
to unite against the \Vest and exclusive in the definition of the non-
Muslim nationalities, Abdulhamid II continued on the modernization 
and secularization of the Ottoman s ta te apparatus. Mardin (ı 981: 
201) argues that Abdulhamid II "continued the work of the Tanzimat 
statesmen for the rationalization and modemization of the state 
apparatus. He lent his support to the expansion of secular courts 
and secular education. He left the medrese to stagnate: by the end of 
his reign they were poorly staffed, poorly financed institutions which 
senTed as a refuge for draft-dodgers." Hamit's support for 
institutional modernization and secular education gaYe rise to new, 
unanticipated attitudes which encouraged the radicalization of 
persons trained in these institutions. One may say that. such 
tendendes were to take Turkey into laicism in the Republican period. 
The strength of the Hamidian state was so embracing that 
religion became an ideologkal tool in the hands of the Caliph, not an 
end itself. Thus, as Ergil states, in practice, the control of the 
religion over temporal affairs came to an end during the reign of this 
celebrated Islamist monarch. This strength of state, according to 
Berkes, was the beginning of a separation of religion and state in the 
minds of the Young Turks who introduced further secularization 
policies with positivist understanding of religion: " ... by establishing 
the omnipotence of his devlet (state), Abdulhamid imperiled the din 
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(religion). There came into existence a cleavage in the minds of the 
intellectuals between the hvo" (Berkes. 1964:290). 
1.2.4 The Young Turk Period 
The Young Turks who came to power \Vith the revolution of 1908 had 
a different program from those of the Ottoman Westernists and the 
Islamists, the other two movements of thought in the Meşrutiyet 
period. According to the Young Turks who were under the influence 
of the writings of Ziya Gökalp, it was necessary to seeularize those 
institutions that had been put under Shariah and made it identical 
with Islam. Modernization efforts could only bear fruit following the 
elimination process of the se anachronistic institutions (Ergil :42 ). 
Their program led to the exclusion of the Sheikh-ul-Islam from the 
cabinet, the separation of religious courts from the Seyhulislanıate 
and their attachment to the ministıy of justice; the placing of the 
administration of pious foundations under the authority of a member 
of the Cabinet; and the separation of medrese from the 
Seyhulislamate and their administration by the ministıy of 
education. In the Young Turk era, Turkish nationalism emerged as a 
strong and eventually dominant current of opinion, adding a 
completely new dimension to the older controversy behveen the 
\Vesternists and the Islamists. From that perspective. in fact. the rise 
of Turkish nationalism facilitated greatly the introduction of the 
radical secularizing reforms of the Kemalist Republic. If one 
contribution of the Young Turk generatian to the development of 
secularism in Turkey was its commitment to ratianal-scientific 
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thought, another was the growth of the idea of the "Turkish nation" 
as the basis of political community (Özbudun, 1984:33). 
1.3 The Republican Era 
The secularization policies of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk can be divided 
into two periods: an early transitional period and a period of radical 
policies of secularization. 
1.3.1 Early Practice 
The 1920-23 period signifies a transition from an empire to anation 
state. The transition occurred at a time when the Nationalist 
Government of Ankara waged a \Var of Independence. The 
Nationalists used Islam as the best cement available at that time. to 
rally mass support. and national unity against the infidel could be 
attained only with the use of Islam as a politically uni(ying force 
(Toprak, 1981:63). The religious leaders or clerics of the time played 
a "middleman" role, and served as a linkage between the central 
government and the provinces in an attempt to secure the 
cooperation of the people. The cooperation of the clerics in turn was 
secured by the Ankara Government through the use of religious 
symbolism which included most notably the Sultanate and the 
Caliphate (Ahmad, 1991:6; Lewis, 1961: 40; Mardin, 1992a: 30). The 
declared goal of the war was to save the two offices said above. This 
was confirmed in the decisions taken in the Sivas and Erzurum 
Cangresses and the opening ceremonies of the First Grand National 
Assembly in 1920 (Toprak, 1981: 64) (7). 
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However, subtle policies to guide the future secularization of 
the state machineıy were undertaken first in this transitional stage. 
The first step was tak en on April 23, ı 920 with the abalition of the 
Office of the Sheikh-ul-Islam, and creation of the Din İşleri ve Evkaf 
Vekaleti (Ministıy of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations) under 
the GNA. The second step was taken with the insertion in to the ı 92 ı 
Constitution of the provision that: "Sovereignty belongs without 
reservation to the people (or na tion)." The provision was a subtle way 
of stating that the base of legitimacy was no langer divine, the 
Ottoman Sultan-Caliph as the Zillullah (Shade of God) was 
supplanted by hakim~vet-i nıilliye (national sovereignty). Of course, 
as some students of Turkish politics mentioned before, what Mustafa 
Kemal and his reform minded friends (hereafter Kemalists) 
understood by "nation" and "national" were different from what the 
religious leaders understood by them. This difference between 
Mustafa Kemal's secular understanding (ulus) and the clerics' 
religious one (unınıa) appeared crucial as Mustafa Kemal later made 
his intentions more visible through his policies (Mardin, 1992a :66; 
Berkes, ı964:493; Şaylan, ı992: 82). The third step was the 
abalition of Sultanate on November 1, ı 922. The law that abolished 
Sultanate separated the two titles, the title of Caliph and that of 
Sultan. The law also stipulated that the new Caliph would be elected 
by the GNA from among the members of the Ottoman dynasty. The 
significance of these laws was that they constituted the first official 
revision in the organization of institutional Islam. The minister of 
Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations and the Caliph were elected 
by the GNA and were responsible to it. Thus religion became part of 
the national sovereignty. 
ı6 
1.3.2 Secularization Policies U nder the Single Party Era (I 923-
1946) 
The secularization policies undertaken by the Kemalists were 
multifaceted, yet interrelated. They are not restricted to those policies 
relating to the relegation of Islam to the private sphere. Different 
policies initiated thus may be seen as integral parts of a whole. 
Attempts to weaken the institutional Islam and to destroy tarikats 
(religious orders) were combined \:vith efforts to seeularize 
educational. legal, social, and political systems. The implementation 
of these policies, especially those relating to Islam, was radical and 
Jacobean (Şaylan, 1992:82). This was mainly a result of the impact 
of the French revolutionaries. Mustafa Kemal took religion as an 
impediment to change and regarded the dualism of the Iate Ottoman 
times as inefficient. 
Secondly, secularism as had been the case in the Iate phase 
of the Empire, was seen as an integral part of Westernization, \:vith 
the difference however that the founders of the Republic had a 
"traditional-versus-modern" type of approach, equating 
modernization \:vith Westemization, religion \:vith conservatism (as a 
deliberate resistance to change), change v • .rith anti-clericalism. 
Actually clericalism in the eyes of Mustafa Kemal connoted the 
exploitation of the religious feelings of the people. 
Thirdly, Kemalist secularism did not accompany \:vith laicism 
--the separation of jurisdiction between state and religion and the 
latter's transformatian into a civil 1 societal matter. The steps taken 
in these processes: 
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(1) Weakening of Institutional Islam. Institutional Islam was 
relegated on March 3, 1924. to a department level with the abolition 
of Caliphate and the creation of D~yanet işleri Reisliği (the Presideney 
of Religious Affairs), attached to the Office of the Prime Minister. and 
of Evkaf Unıuın Müdürlüğü (the Directorate General of Foundation s). 
an independent agency, much of the fınancial support of which came 
from the government. In Toprak's words, "[t}hrough these offıces, 
religious functionaries, religious property, and private vakı!S were 
put un der state control" (Toprak, 1981: 46). The common purpose of 
these policies was to cut Islam off its political and social dimensions, 
that is, to depoliticise the religion. Islam's political and social 
dimensions had come to be represented by the institutions created in 
its name. Thus Islam to a large e:x.i.ent de-institutionalized. In 
addition to the Iegitimating function of Islam, an attempt was made 
to destroy the social function that it had come to play as a link 
between the central govemment and the people. The policies in 
question were also aimed at preventing any potential 
counterrevolution of a religious nature (Şaylan, 1992:80). The 
Nationalists thought that the clerics who had proved their influence 
on the people during the War posed a menacing threat to the 
Republican regime. The weakening of institutional Islam and the 
taking of what remained from that religion under the state control 
was a Iogical conclusion. 
(2) Secularization of Education With the enactment of the so called 
Tevhid-i Tedrisat (Law for the Unification of Education) on March 3 
1924, the medreses and other religious schools were closed and all 
schools were tied to the Ministıy of Education. Thus religious 
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education became part of national education system. Mustafa I\emal 
himself stated that it was the nıektep rather than the medrese where 
one should complete religious education (Köker, ı993: ı67). The 
rationale behind unification of education had the purpose of 
disseminating the Kemalist principle. In other words the new 
educational system was to be the means of creating a new society 
composed of enlightened, rational, and anti-clerical individuals. After 
all, in the Kemalists eyes the school was the best available channel 
for "cultural transformation" (Toprak, 198 ı: 51 ). The creation of such 
an "absent minded society" (Köker, 1993: 163), one whose ties with 
its Ottoman past was broken necessitated the change of alphabet 
from the Arab to the Latin script. As Ahmad (1993: 80) thinks that 
the most iconoclastic reform of secularization policies was the 
change of script. At a stroke, even the literate people were cut of their 
past (8). Secularization of education went on with the "turkification" 
of history and language: Society for the Study of Turkish History 
(Türk Tarih Kurunıu) was created in ı93ı with the aim of studying 
the pre-Ottoman Turkish history and Turkish Linguistic Society 
(Türk Dil Kurumu) was set up in ı 932 \Vith the purpose of purifying 
the Turkish language from those of Arabic and Persian words. 
(3) Secularization of Law and Social Life In ı924, the Shariah 
courts were abolished, distinctly secular courts were abolished, and 
the court system was unified under the Ministry of Justice. This was 
followed by the adoption of the Swiss Civil Code and of Obligations. 
Inheritance, marriage, divorce ete. were no longer governed by the 
dietates of religion, but by secular laws. The adoption of Western hat 
and Western styles (1925), the Gregorian calendar (1926), family 
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nam es (1934 ), the adoption of the S\viss Civil Code as an effort to 
transform the status of women (1926), the change of the weekly 
holiday from Friday to Sunday (1935), were aimed to "\Vesternize" the 
people and the socially based relations between them and to 
integrate Turkey into the \Vest. In the eyes of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
these reforms were necessary to get rid of ignorance, fanaticism, and 
to emulate the civilized world. Mustafa Kemal (Nutuk: 738) in one of 
his speeches, made clear that : 
Gentlemen, it was necessary to abolish the fez 
which sat on our heads as a sign of ignorance, of 
fanaticism, of hatred to progress and civilization, 
and to adopt in its place the hat, the customary 
headdress of the whole civilized world, thus 
showing, among other things, that no difference 
existed in the manner of thought between the 
Turkish nation and the whole family of civilized 
mankin d. 
Despite these policies, Islam until 1928 continued to be the 
state religion, and the GNA was entrusted with the duty of enforcing 
the principles of Shariah. Only in that year it was adopted a proposal 
suggested by İsmet İnönü and his 120 colleagues for amendments in 
the 1924 Constitution. Article 2 of that Constitution, which stated 
the "religion of the state [was] the religion of Islam", was lifted. Article 
26 of the same Constitution, which had entrusted the GNA with the 
duty of "enforcing the provisions of Shariah", was also lifted. The 
constitutional formalization of Turkish secularism came with the 
revised Constitution of 1937, which stated that the Turkish state was 
a secular state. Therefore Turkish secularism was introduced as the 
disassociation of social, economic, political, legal institutions of the 
state from religious principles. 
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(4) Reform in the religion A Faculty of Divinity (İlahiyat Fakültesıl at 
the Dar'ül-fünun was opened in 1924. \Vith the transformatian of the 
Dar'ül-fünun into the University of Istanbul in 1933. an Institute for 
the Study of Islam (İslanı İnceleıneleri Enstitüsü) was opened in 
place of the Faculty. Hmvever the Institute survived up only until 
1936. The purpose in the creation of both was to make possible the 
study of Islam with scientific criteria and to find means in that 
religion to reform it. 
The basis of Kemalist religious policy was not irreligion, its 
aim was to end the power of religion and as it is elaborated later in 
this chapter, of religious groups in political, social and cultural 
matters and to limit it to the matters of belief and worship. In other 
words, the Kemalist reformers wanted not to be rid of Islam but to 
"turkifY" it. Stirling (1958: 400) arrives at the conclusion that the 
Kemalists sought a completely Turkish form of ceremony and 
compared themselves explicitly to the Protestants. In 1928, the 
faculty of divinity appointed a committee presided by professor 
Mehmet Fuad Köprülü to examine the problem of reform and 
modernization in the Islamic religion. Its report begins v.rith a clear 
assertian that religion is a social institution, it must meet the needs 
of life and keep pace with change and development (Lewis. 
1961:414). Only one of the recommendations (9) of the committee 
had a practical consequence, i.e. translation of the ezan (the call to 
prayer) into Turkısh which was fırst put into practice in 1931 and 
became legally compulsory in 1941. 
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(5) Abalition of Religious Orders Islam in Turkey has always 
functioned on two levels: the formal, legal religion of the state which 
is now represented by the Presideney of Religious Affairs and the 
popular, mystical religion of masses \Vhich found its expressian in 
religious orders. The religious orders has provided a different world 
view and an interpretation of religion as Mardin (1992b: 94) calls 
"folk Islam". Although religious orders seem to have rallied to the 
support of the nationalists in Anatolia, in 1925 the Kemalist 
reformists abolished the religious orders and their convents were 
dissolved and their ceremonies were banned. It was from the 
religious orders, not from the ulenıa that the most dangerous 
resistance to secularism would come. According to Mustafa Kemal, 
the survival of the tarikats would be the greatest, most irreparable 
threat to the cause of progress and reawakening. Again, in one of his 
speeches, he ınade clear that: 
Gentleınen, while the law regarding the 
Restaration of Order was in force that took place 
also the dosing of the tekkes, of the convents, 
and of the mausoleuıns, as well as the abalition 
of all sects and all kinds of titles such as Sheikh, 
dervish, so on. One will be able to imagine how 
necessary, through of these measures was, in 
order to prove that our nation as a whole was 
no primitive nation, filled with superstitions and 
prejudices. (Nutuk: 700) 
\Vith Kemalist secularization policies, the duality of Iate 
Ottoman times was resolved in favor of Western civilization. The 
question was no longer that of finding some means to integrate 
Islamic institutions with the Western ones, the Kemalists rather 
decided that religious institutions had to be destroyed. Such an 
understanding sternmed from Mustafa Kemal's identifıcation of the 
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Oitoman demise with Islam; Islam was responsible, Mustafa Kemal 
thought, for the fate of the Empire because it resisted change 
(Toprak, 1981: 38). What was to be done for the Kemalists then was 
to cut Islam off its political and social dimensions, represented by the 
institutional and folk Islams. That was necessary to prevent its 
resurgence as a competing political ideology. Kemalist secularization 
relating to Islam went beyond its de-politicization. It also included its 
rationalization: an attempt to create a rational (Western-like}, and 
nationalisi Islam. 
According to Mustafa Kemal, a drive for an enlightened and 
humanized Islam was absolutely necessary (Berkes, 1964:483). This 
effort of religious reformation was evident in the translation of the 
Qur'an and the ezanandin the "Proposals for Reform in Islam" made 
by a purposely-created committee. The application of the 
secularization policies was necessarily rigid. The creation of the so-
called Independence Tribunals (İstiklal Mahkemelen1 and the Martial 
Law Tribunals (Sılayönetim Mahkenıelen1 and the enactment of the 
Law Against Treason (Hiyaneti Vatan~ye Kanunu) and of the Law for 
the Restaration of Order (Takıir-i Sükun Kanunu) all shared the 
common purpose of preventing or suppressing counterrevolutionary 
movements like the Sheikh Said rebellion of 1925 and similar ones, 
all sharing a religious nature (Toprak, 1981: 67). The Progressive 
Republican Party, the only opposition to the Republican People's 
Party (RPP), was closed down. This marked the end of multiparty 
politics for the next 20 years. The Free Republican Party, founded in 
1930 by Fethi Okyar, a close friend of Mustafa Kemal was permitted 
as a tame opposition party. Again the opposition to the regime 
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coalesced raund this party and attacked the secular policy of the 
government. The ruling elite was alarmed and eventually decided to 
dissolve the party. A month later, a violent incident of Menemen 
shocked the secular military-bureaucratic group and the regime 
became more rigid on the issue of religious opposition. 
With the establishment of the Presideney of Religious Affairs 
(D~yanet İşleri Başkanlığı), religion became subservient to the state. 
As regards the fusion of the state and Islam, both before ı 928, ı 937 
and after the latter date, state and religion continued to be fused 
together. The difference between the Imperial practice and the 
Republican policy was the reversal of the locus of the control: It was 
no langer Islam which govemed the state but the practice was the 
other way araund (Toprak, 1981: 2). The Empire vanished as a 
religion-bound state whereas the Republic created a state-bound 
religion. Kemalist secularism was inconsistent that it did not 
separate religion and state and it did not let religion have its ov.rn 
autonomous existence. It was the reorganization of the hierarchy of 
the ulema and drastic reduction of its functions to only matters of 
worship and belief. In that sense, one may think that the Republican 
secularism did not end the unity of state and religion (din-u-devlet). 
During the 1 930s, the pressure of secularization became very 
strong indeed. The Sheikh Said rebellion of ı 925 and Menemen 
incident of ı 930 proved that the secular reforms had not tak en root. 
the Kemalists decided to take offensive and educate the masses 
ideologically by emphasizing nationalism and downplaying the role of 
religion. Islam itself would have to be nationalized, the change of the 
call to prayer from Arabic to Turkish was a sign of attitude towards 
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such canception of religion. Ahmad (1988 : 755) argues that the 
attitude towards religion of the single party regimes in the Europe of 
the 1930s - ltaly, Germany and the Soviet Union- had an impact in 
Turkey. 
1.3.3 The Transition to Multiparty Politics (1946-1960) 
The restaration of party politics in 1946 compelled the RPP 
government to change its policy towards religion. The concern of the 
RPP leaders that the Democrats would capitalize on the issue of 
religion led to a reappraisal of the party's secularization policies. The 
party's understanding of secularism, for the first time, was subjected 
to criticism during the 7th General Congress of the RPP in 1947 
(Toprak, 1981 : 77). Some delegates pointed out that in order to 
strengthen the society's moral foundations it was therefore necessary 
to accept a more liberal attitude on religious education without fear 
that this would lead to religious reaction (Mardin, 1991: 32; Karpat, 
1959: 280). Thus, the RPP government initiated some liberal policies 
on the issue of religious education and worship after the Congress. 
The 1947-49 period saw the preparation of a program for the 
reopening of religious educational institutions and funding of private 
religious courses. The establishment of a faculty of divinity, the 
permission for pilgrimage to Mecca and the reopening of the sacred 
tombs were the other measures of relaxation on secularism. 
With the inception of democratic politics, between 1945 and 
1950, eight political parties were established with explicit religious 
themes in their programs. Religion, for the fırst time in the 
Republican history became an input in the political process. All 
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except the Nation Party (Millet Partisı] disappeared from the political 
arena by 1950. To be noted is the fact that it was the RPP first to 
have politicized religion for electoral considerations. 
The DP government continued the liberal policies it inherited. 
The Democrats and the Republicans in fact cooperated on two 
important issues concerning secularism. The first was the lifting in 
1950 of the ban on the recital of the ezan in Arabic in 1950 which 
passed with unanimous vote (Toprak, 1981: 79). The second was an 
amendment, made in the Turkish criminal code (Article 163). The 
amendment was about the "outlawed organizational activities aimed 
at changing the structure of the govemıneni on the basis of religious 
principle" (Toprak, 1981: 74). 
Despite the allegation that the Democrats betrayed the 
Kemalist secularism, such cooperation indicates that the Democrats 
were no less sensitive to the principle of secularism than the 
Republicans were. Celal Bayar and Fuat Köprülü stated on several 
occasions that their party was secularist and against religious 
obscurantism. \Vhen the Democrats came to power and began to 
retreat from some of stricter policies of secularization, there was no 
consideration of repudiating fundamental tenets of secularism such 
as ulema power over education. The Democrats were not about to 
permit anything resembling a counter-revolution, that is to say even 
a partial return to Jslamic Law. \Vhen the Sufi Orders which had 
gone underground began to reappear and attacked the Kemalism 
such as the Tijaniyya (l 0), the Democrats took these anti-secular 
movements seriously enough and the Tijanis were punished for their 
anti-Atatürk outrages. 
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What the Democrats did was to re-interpret the existing 
understanding of secularism, rather than introduce a new one 
(Şaylan, 1992 : 89). They adopted a moderate understanding of 
secularism, unlike the militani secularism of the single party era. 
and continued some relaxation policies: the broadcasting of the 
Qur'an readings over the state radio, broadening of the scope of 
religious education and the expansion of the budget of the 
Presideney of Religious Affairs. 
The moderate understanding and application of secularism is 
evinced in a distinction made by Prime Minister Adnan Menderes 
behveen the "principles of Kemalism which had been internalized by 
the people and which had failed to take neat" (Toprak, 1981: 78). The 
Jatter was subjected to change. 
The Republicans kept silent about the religious issue in the 
1954-57 period. This was indicative of the fact that Islam's role in the 
political interplay declined (Toprak, 1981: 84). Only in 1957 (and 
later) when the economic miraele of the DP governments began to 
fade, the prime minister Menderes manipulated religion for political 
purposes (Ahmad, 1988 : 756). He e.x.iensively used religious themes 
and accused the RPP of its neglect of Islam during the single party 
era, while the RPP leadership emphasized that they were the first to 
have initiated the relaxation on the understanding and 
implementation of secularism. Menderes cultivated the goodwiH of 
Said-i Nursi and his fallawers the Nurists. 
The controversy over the religious matters were intensified 
further in 1959. This was mostly a taetic on behalf of the Democrats 
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designeel to divert attention from its mismanagement of the economy. 
\Vhile the Democrats portrayeel the Republicans as anti theistic, the 
latter rejected the contention and in response accused the former of 
encouraging reactionism (irtica). This course of accusation and 
counter accusation went on until the May 27 military intenrention of 
1960. 
The Democrat's utilization of religion for political ends 
provided the single most important justification for the military 
intervention in 1960 (Heper, 1987: 55; Mardin, 1991: 78, 124). 
In sum, the establishment of the multiparty system in Turkey 
led, as a consequence, to a more liberal interpretation of secularism. 
This liberalization did not affect the state institutions, despite 
allowing v..rider scope to religious education and practices. It may be 
said that religious liberalization was a natural outcome of democracy 
and a necessary adjustment to it. This tolerant attitude of the 
Derncerat Party which was secular in orientation but responsive to 
the pragmatic needs of the population made it popular among voters. 
It is therefore the end of the 1960s the religiously based political 
ideologies in Turkey began to proliferate \vithin the contex1. of this 
liberalization. The liberalization policies of the Democrats provided 
suitable grounds for the revival of religious orders and communities 
which later were the supporters of the religiously-based political 
parties, namely the National üreler Party (MNP) and the National 
Salvation Party (MSP). 
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L3.4 The Emergence ofThe National Salvation Party(l960-80) 
The makers of the 1961 Constitution shared the view \vith the RPP 
Ieadership that the DP betrayed Kemalism by exploiting the religious 
feelings (Heper, 1987 : 55; Mardin, 1991: 78,124). The solution 
which they found to prevent the politicians' utilization of religion was 
two-fold: placing the freedam of belief, conscience. worship and 
education under constitutional guarantee while at the same time 
providing a constitutional legitimacy to the previous legal 
prohibitions on the use of religion for political ends through article 
19 (Şaylan, 1992: 98; Toprak, 1981: 91). The 1961 constitution 
brought preventive measures canceming the use of religion 
(politicization of Islam) for political purposes. Article 19 states: ll No 
individual can exploit religion in order to change the social. 
economic, political or legal structure of the state according to 
religious principles, neither can he use religion to further his 
personal or political interests. ll 
Therefore what had been institutionalized in the 1946-60 era 
(more respect for religious belief and worship, and greater allocation 
of state resources for religious institutions and education) was 
counterbalanced by more penalty for the politicization of Islam 
rroprak. 1981: 92 ). 
The 1960-65 period era was one of silence and tranquillity in 
the religious issue (Toprak, 1981 : 92). As eleetaral politics became 
re-institutionalized by the mid-1960s, the controversy over the 
politicization of Islam once again tumed out to be crucial (Toprak, 
1988: 124). For instance, İnönü accused during the 1966 senate 
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elections the Justice Party (JP), which claimed to be the successor to 
the DP, of its cooperation with the Nurcu movement. The JP 
leadership on the other hand, exerted no effort to disprove their 
connections with religious circles; the party's emblem and its leader 
Demirel's speeches were designed to show their advocacy of Islam's 
voice (Toprak, 1981: 92 ). The se in fact were the years when the 
religious orders came out from under ground, if not completely --a 
process which had begun in the 1946-60 period (Şaylan. 1992: 99). 
With the emergence of the Left-Right cleavage in the 1965 
elections, the left represented the anti-clerical while the right the 
derical as reminiscent of the case in France (Toprak, 1981: 15 ). The 
right portrayed the Left as communist-oriented and bence atheistic, 
while the left accused the right of backing reactionism. 
Shift in the RPP's understanding of secularism as a result of 
the populist Ecevit group's rise to power in the party leadership. 
Ecevit's populism included a deliberate refraining from escalating the 
religious issue into a major controversy; he indeed put a halt to the 
classical RPP slogan publicly known as "secularism is getting out of 
hand." Ecevit thus brought a new reading of secularism to the RPP, 
one which does not clash or contradict with the "beliefs of the 
people." It was this Ieadership after all which formed a coalition 
government with the National Salvation Party (NSP) after the 1973 
general election. 
The National Salvation Party (NSP) was a neo-Islamic party 
which had an effect of the partial re-traditionalization of Turkish 
culture along Islamic precepts. It had its origins in the National 
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Ord er Party (MNP) which established in ı 969 and closed down after 
ı 97 ı by the Constitutional Court for having used religion for political 
purposes. It reemerged before the ı 973 election u nder the NSP 
banner. The NSP leaders had a critical attitude towards the Ottoman 
and Republican modernization process. They strongly opposed to the 
identification of modernization with Westernization and introduced a 
new understanding of modernity which is an amalgamation of Islam 
and the Heavy Industry Effort (Ağır Sanayi Hamlesı}. The 
\Vesternization process which began with the Tanzimat, according to 
the NSP, signaled the end of grandeur for Ottoman society. A need 
for "A Grand Turkey Once Again," therefore, had to pass through the 
abandonment of reliance on the West both in cultural and economic 
terms. The "National Outlook" (Milli Görüş), the ideology of the NSP. 
promised a country which would be fully industrialized through 
economic cooperation with the Islamic world. Of course, the 
prerequisite of this success was the return to Islam as the basis of 
social organization {Toprak, ı988 : ı25). 
It was obvious that the real hidden desire of the NSP was an 
Islamic state based on the principles of Shariah in spite of the party's 
declaration of loyalty to the principle of secularism {Alkan, ı984: 90). 
The NSP's approach to the issue of seculaıism was dualistic in its 
nature. At the official level, expressed in the speeches of party 
leaders and in official documents, the NSP favored secularism. At the 
unoffıcial level, however, the wıitings of party ideologists in Milli 
Gazete, the party was in favor of the abolishment of the pıinciple of 
seculaıism which contradicts political principles of Islam (1 1 ). An 
important characteıistic of the NSP was its link to the Nakshibendi 
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order and other religious communit.ies (Zarcane, 1993: l 03). In that 
sense, the revival of Islam which has started with the inception of 
democratic parties took a political form or in other words, the NSP 
legitimized the political nature of religious interests. Moreover. 
Toprak ( 198 ı: ı 08} thinks, for the first time in the history of 
Republic, there has emerged a counter-elite with a different cultural 
orientation (Islamic culture) than that of \:Vesternists. Since the NSP 
rejected the notian that Westernization is a requirement of 
modernization and put an emphasis on the spiritual values (Islam) 
as the basis of development, it represented a renewal of the ı 9th 
century search for an Islami c model of modernity (Toprak, ı 98 ı: 
ı04). Mardin (1977: 596) shares alsa this idea by stating that "the 
NSP has achieved a sart of successful synthesis with modernization 
that has been unprecedented in Turkish history." 
ı .4 Methodology 
In this study, secularism as a concept is taken to mean not only a 
legal-institutional separation between religion and state but alsa a 
fundamentally rationalist and positivist attitude towards life and a 
non-religious way of defining the basis of a political community. 
Given this definition of secularism, I analyze Evren's and Özal's 
conceptualizations of secularism with reference to their 
interpretations of religion and its role in Turkish socio-political life 
and to their attitudes towards religious orders. 
The preseni study covers a) the speeches of Kenan Evren 
(1980-ı989) and Turgut Özal (1979-1993), published by the Turkish 
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Grand National Assembly Pıint house (TBMM Basımevi}, and Prime 
Ministry Print house (Başbakanlık Basınıevı), b) their memoirs. 
published in A1ill~yet and Sabah, respectively and c) a comprehensive 
survey of Milliyet, from ı November ı 989 to 7 Apıil 1993; Zaman 
from 1 January 1987 to 7 May 1993 and; Brieflng, from ı January 
1990 to 20 Apıil 1993. 
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NOTES 
{l) As Lewis (1991: 3) aptly points out, eve n in modern usage, there 
is no Muslim equivalent to "the church" meaning "ecclesiastical 
organization." All different word s for mosque denote only a building 
which is a place of worship, not an abstraction, an authority or an 
institution. 
(2) The famous sociologist and nationalisi theoretician Ziya Gökalp 
coined a Turkish Word, Jadini which was often taken to mean 
"irreligious" or even "anti religious." Later it was replaced by layik, a 
word borrowed from the French (Lewis, 1988: 117). 
(3) Some other students of Turkish politics share the idea that the 
Ottoman Empire was not a theocratic state, see Mardin, 1991: 89-
166; İnalcık, 1969: 438; Turan, 1991: 32; Ortaylı, 1986: 161; see 
also Levlis, 1988: 29-30 on the question whether the Islamic polity is 
theocratic. 
(4) It was the küttap (bureaucrats) who were responsible for 
preserving the basic concept and institutions of the pre-Islamic 
Middle Eastern State. They always formed a closely organized group 
and, at times, did not hesitate to introduce innovations in 
administrative with the sole purpose of serving state interests. It was 
they who were responsible for the fonuulation of the kanuns (laws) 
issued by the Sultan. See İnalcık (1969: 438-440) for further detail. 
(5) Two main goals, which the central govemıneni had, lie behind 
such recognition: to be able to mobilize the masses behind the state 
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and against the local notables, as well as constitut.ing a strategy to 
appease the Great Powers (Heper, 1985: 39). 
(6) The Sultan implemented an intelligent policy, establishing 
contract.s with sheikhs and dervishes, using propaganda to reconcile 
the Arab population to an Ottoman identity. In Anatolia, at least. the 
policy did have some success in building some sense of Muslim 
identity among the subjects. 
(7) One fifth of the numbers of the first Grand National Assembly 
belonged to the class of professional men of religion, and same of 
them both from the ulema and the brotherhoods, played an 
important place in the Kemalist mavement (Lewis, 1961: 402). The 
nationalisi govemıneni showed same tolerance to the religious 
groups -i.e. doing nothing prejudicial to the opening of 465 new 
medresesin the period under consideration (Şaylan, 1990: 82) 
(8) İsmet İnönü's statement is confirmatory in this regard. "The script 
reform had been made not only to provide ease in reading and 
writing. We made it rather to change our culture. We made it to get 
rid of the Arab culture" (Ceylan, 1990: 1 78). 
(9) The committee recommended pews, cloakrooms and shoes in 
mosques - it wanted the entire proceeding to be conducted in 
Turkish and modern sacred instrumental music. See, for detail, 
(Lewis, 1961: 414-415; Starling, 1958: 400). 
(10) For further detail on the Tijaniyya order see (Mardin, 1991: 101; 
Ahmad, 1991: ll). 
35 
(ll} On the National Salvation Party and its world view see Jacob M. 
Landau "The National Salvation Party in Turkey" Asian and African 
Studies ll (1976} p. 1-57. It is reprinted by the Hebrew Univ. of 
Jerusalem (Alkan, 1984: 79-102}. Ali Yaşar Sanbay, Türkiye'de 
Modenıleşnıe, Din ve Parti Politikası "MSP önıek olayı," 1985, 
Istanbul: Alan yay. and also Toprak, 1981 Islam and Political 
Developnıent. 
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CHAPTERTWO 
EVREN'S CONCEPTUALIZATION OF SECULARISM 
2.1 Military Intervention of 1980 
Some open challenges to Kemalist secularism was one of the reasons 
for the pre-1980 erisis which brought the military intervention in 
Turkey. The intervention took place right after the "Save Jerusalem" 
rally of 6 September 1980 in Konya, organized by the National 
Salvation Party. At the rally, demonstrators marched in the long 
robes and fez cap, carrying green flags and shouting slogans for the 
restaration of an Islamic state and some of the attendants refused to 
stand for the playing of the national anthem. The Konya meeting was 
prominent among the reasons Evren gave for the military decision to 
intervene in politics. Evren (1981: 17; 1990a: 220} noted this fact in 
his new s conference with the following words: "... the inciden ts at 
Konya indicated the extent of dimensions of [religious) reactionism. 
Our notian was awakened by these incidents and realized all the 
aspects of the danger." 
\Vith the conviction the existing parties before the 
intervention had weakened the state, all political parties were 
disbanded, their assets seized and their leaders banned from political 
activity including NSP and Erbakan. The aim of the military 
government was to strengthen the state and to reestablish the 
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democracy through a new constitution. The I 982 constitution was 
designed to prevent the excessive politicization of groups and 
institutions and to set up a new "polity which develop its own 
structures for moderating conflict" (Heper, 1965: 145). The reference 
to " the Turkish histarical and moral values" in the Preamble of the 
1982 Constitution was a novelty directed to reduce ideological 
tensions \vithin the society. One may think that the "Turkish moral 
and histarical values" was the use of Islam for political purposes in a 
distinct fashion: Islam would be used only as a source of ethics and 
culture but it would not be politicized for short-term political 
consideration. It is not necessary to reiterate that: "Although 
absolutely opposed to the utilization of religion for political purposes, 
the military proved itself to be more congenial on the issue of the role 
of religion in society than the post-Atatürk bureaucratic intelligentsia 
had ever been" (Heper, 1985: 134). 
The utilization of religion by the military was an integral part 
of the project that aimed at creating a new system of ethics in the 
post-1980 Turkish polity. The notion of "solidarity around the idea of 
Motherland" as one of the two functions of this system of ethics 
would be further strengthened by emphasizing the unifying feature of 
Islam (Heper, 1985: 147). 
Equally evident is that the military regime, despite its daim 
to restore "true Ataturkism" which would mean enforcing solidarism 
in a strict manner and refusing to use religion as a tool, was also 
\villing to use religion to arrest politicization among the young. The 
military government, by accepting the idea that an individual \vith 
belief in God would be less inclined to commit crimes than one 
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\vithout an:y Spiıitual side, made the religious education compulsory 
in primary and secondary schools Article 24 of the new Constitution 
states: "Education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be 
conducted under state supervision and control instruction in 
religious culture and moral education shall be compulsory in the 
curricula of primary and secondary schools." 
It is obvious that the military regime had modified the army's 
previously strict stand on secularism and tried to reconcile religion 
v.ith Kemalism and secularism. General Evren, as the head of the 
military government, narrated versus from the Qur'an as apoint of 
reference in an attempt to justify secular policies of the military 
government and some passages which colored Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk as a devout Muslim (Şaylan, 1992: 107) were inserted into 
the newly-printed te:x'tbooks. A report of the Special Expertise 
Commission on National Culture (Milli Kültür Özel ihtisas 
Konıisyonu), printed in 1983 by the State Planning Organization 
(Devlet Planlanıa Teşkilatı) reveals the military govemment's 
approach to religion: "Atatürk strived for the rescue of the people 
from ignorance, but without leaving religion and morality. It is for 
this reason that he said that 'Turkish nation must be pious and 
learn its religion. It is in need of only one place to learn its religion, it 
is the school.' It is for this reason that he enacted the law for the 
Unifıcation of Education. The National Security Council relying on 
this law and directives, made compulsory the courses on religion and 
morality" (Şaylan, 1992: lll) 
These were all efforts to fınd a middle way between Islam and 
the state. Without abandaning the offıcial commitment to secularism 
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(Article 2), the militaıy government had adopted some of the 
. 
elements of "the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis" as in the case of 
compulsoıy religious education (Tapper, 1991: ll; Ahmad, 1993: 
184; Şaylan, 1992: 113). 
During the Iate 1970s, a group of intellectuals came together 
to overcome the apparent dichotomy between the official 
Commitment to secular nationalism and oppositional proponents of 
an Islamic identity by projecting the idea of a Turkish-Islamic 
synthesis araund the Intellectuals' Hearth (Aydınlar Ocağı). This 
mavement wished to bring traditional values and Islam as a part of 
national culture to the surface, topeel away the false Western veneer 
(Tapper, 1991: ll) which was so corrupting and ultimately to 
recognize a national synthesis of fundamental values. On the other 
hand, Evren as the head of National Security Council unequivocally 
noted that there \\r:ill be no place in the new Turkish polity for 
"fascism," "Marxism," and "theocracy," and he insisted that 
"nationalism of Atatürk" should be basis of the Republic of Turkey 
(Heper, 1985: 144). Evren also expressed a good deal of disquiet 
about religion both in its social and political aspects. As a 
consequence, one may say that the military regime had applied a 
mild form of Islamic doctrines, and it was designed to reinforce 
rather than contradict state's own authority. Such role of religion as 
a social cement lies well within the general framework of the military 
government's proposal of reestablishing democracy in a de politicized 
society based on law and order. 
One of the changes in the military regime's attitude observed 
in the field of foreign policy where Turkey developed closer relations 
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with the conservative Muslim countries like Saudi Arabia and the 
Gulf States. This demonstrated a need for the definition of the official 
position of the state. For instance, in ı982, Evren told in a meeting 
in Istanbul of the governors of the Islamic Development Bank that 
'Turkey is an inextricable part of the Islami c community." It is hard 
to imagine that any president of Turkey could have made such a 
pronouncement in earlier decades \Vithout provoking a storm of 
protest. 
2.2 The Notian of Secularism 
Evren has been strongly committed to the pıinciple of secularism 
and its maintenance as one of the main pillars of the Turkish 
Republic and Atatürk reforms, as has already being shown in the 
preceding chapter Evren clarifies the reasons for the military 
intervention of l2th September in the follmving words: "The 
Operation Flag (Bayrak Harekatı) has been made against those who 
aimed at bringing religious reactionism and other perverted 
ideologies in ord er to protect the secular Republic" (ı 98 ı: 1 7). As 
would be expected, the importance that Evren places on the principle 
of secularism is in conformity with the military's perception of 
themselves as the most ardent upholders and guardians of the ideas 
of Atatürk. The" Save Jerusalem" rally of the NSP has alarmed Evren 
to the extent that he took it as "a rehearsal to revitalize the 31 Mart 
event" (2). According to Evren, secularism, apart from the fact that it 
is a guarantee for the freedam of religion, also safeguards against 
religious fundamentalism. Evren (ı988: 42) emphasizes the vital 
importance of secularism in the following way: "As we all know, 
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secularism is not only a guarantee for the freedom of religion and 
. 
conscience but also it provides continuation of our national unity 
and cooperation. At the same time, it constitutes a strong shield 
which protect our democratic regime against e:A'lremist and 
reactionaıy religious movements." 
For Evren, it would not be correct to say that today there is a 
possibility of going back to 1500 years earlier and, in his opinions, 
those who are striving for religious reactionism and Shariah are just 
a drop in an ocean. Evren (1987a: 413) is also sure that secularism 
is a world view that all Turkish nation has accepted as a way to be 
developed and modern. The guarantee of secularism in Turkey is the 
sineere commitment of all Turkish nation to the parliament, 
government, mass media, universities and the youth. to the ve:ry 
principle of secularism. 
Evren thinks that secular state also p:revents the possible 
state pressures upon human conscience and leave people free to 
choose their faith and conduct their worship and religious services. 
Evren (1988: 380) makes this point clear in his answer to the written 
questions of the correspondent of Die Welt newspaper by these 
statements: 
I am not against the people who are devoted to 
their faith and perform their prayers but 
according to the principles of our religion, nobody 
has the right to interfere with the relations 
between God and individual whether they 
worship and practice religious duties or not. Our 
religion does not empower anyone to punish on 
the grounds that he does not practice thei:r 
religious duties. Our constitution and laws 
e:A"})ress the same thing as well. 
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\Vhat is familiar here is a reiteration of the freedom of 
conscience and worship which is embodied in said Constitution as 
Article 24 states: "Eveıyone has the right to freedom of conscience. 
religious belief and conviction. Act of worship, religious senrices and 
ceremonies shall be conducted freely- No one shall be compelled to 
worship or participate in religious ceremonies and rites, to reveal 
religious beliefs and convictions-". \\That is novel here is the reference 
to religion as a source to justifY his definition (understanding) of 
secularism. One may conclude that this reference to religion is an 
evident of Evren's utilization of religion for the purposes to oppose 
the arguments of the religious fundamentalists. 
Evren (1988: 322) explicitly holds that, in his various 
speedıes and meetings, secularism necessitates tl1e implementation 
of state affairs not \vi thin the framework of religious rules but on the 
basis of the separation of religion and state. "Our constitution 
recognizes the freedom of religion and conscience to all citizens but 
makes impossible to rule the state in accordance \vith the religious 
rules and laws" (Evren, 1988: 322). Evren, here is pointing to a well-
known definition of secularism which is included in the preamble of 
the 1982 Constitution: "That as required by the principle of 
secularism, there shall be no interference whatsoever of sacred 
feelings in state affairs and politics." Needless to say, Evren pays 
enough attention to the fact that the principle of secularism as an 
integral part of Constitution does not permit the exploitation of 
religion or utilization of religion for political purposes while ensuring 
the freedom of religion for other religions as well: 
We have a constitutional system that ensures 
freedom of religion and conscience. We do not 
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inierfere w:iih any body's religion and faiih. 
People belonging to several religions have been 
living in peace arid performing their religious 
duties \vithout any pressure for long centuries in 
our country. What we may not permit is the 
exploiiation of religion for political show or for the 
destruciion of the religion. (Evren, 1988: 322} 
Evren (l990a: 85} lays a major shame of the blame for the 
pre-1980 intervention erisis on the religious reactionism and on the 
political parties that exploited religion for the political purposes. 
Then he puts his fınger on one of the key subjects in the Turkish 
politics: the use of Islam, "those who exploited Islam and devout 
Muslims' faith for eleetaral considerations" asserts Evren "are the 
primary responsible of the country's current problems and crisis." In 
the same vein, he (1988: 18} strongly rejects the idea that secularism 
is irreligion (atheism) as it is voiced by religious circles: "Secularism 
is not atheism. These who daim that secularism is atheism are the 
exploiters of our belief, and faith and aim at disintegrating our 
country by preseniing a wrong (false) defınition of secularism." Of 
course, religion itself is beyand the accusation that it plays a role of 
disintegrating the country. Moreover, Evren (1988: 322} states that 
religion is a matter between God and individual, and God has not 
authorized anybody to intervene in the beliefs of human beings in the 
follmving way: "Religion, in its essence, is a direct relationship 
between God and individual as one American thinker said 'God 
en ters by a private d oor to every individual'." What Evren propose 
here is a secular interpretation of religion supposed to be a matter of 
private life but not anything else. Evren's defınition of seculaıism 
gives no place to the right of religious organization and involvement 
in politics as his statements (1988: 325) makes it clear: "The 
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principle of secularism in Turkish Republic suggest to provide and 
safeguard the freedam of worship and conscience to the individual 
but to linıit religious activities to the faitlı and worship and to give 
the rights of religion to religion and the rights of state to the state" 
(my emphasis). As it is elaborated later, the religious activities 
pertaining the political and social life would mean the repudiation of 
secularism, namely, the separation of religion and the state. 
In Evren's view, secularism has been tightly interrelated to 
the idea of modernization and the aim of reaching at the level of 
modern civilization. Without secularism, the goal of modernization, 
Evren (1987a:250) underlies, will remain just a dream. It should not 
be forgotten that although the Kemalist identification of 
modernization Vvith Westemization has lost its significance during 
1 970s, Evren, du e to his strong commitment to the Kemalist view, 
understands secularism as a world view to be developed and modern. 
In this respect, he embraces the secularism to get one basic mission 
of the Republican State when Atatürk put as the idea of the Turkish 
society: "to elevate the people to the level of contemporary 
civilization" (Heper, 1985: 50). This conviction is supported by an 
observation that: "it is not possible to see any non-secular country 
which catches up with the civilized world" (Evren, 1990: 23). 
Evren argues that most of the Islamic countries wish to adopt 
secularism wholeheartedly, but they do not have a courage, knowing 
the fact that there will be a turmail in their countries. Thanks to 
Atatürk, Evren, in his various speeches, notes the fact that Turkey 
today represents an exceptional political model articulating a Muslim 
society and a secular democracy together (Evren, 1988: 244 ). 
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It is true to say that whenever Evren talks about secularism, 
religious fundamentalism appears in his words as a significant 
phenomenon. In fact, Evren (l987a: 253), in his vvritten message for 
the new year 1987, equates religious fundamentalism with 
reactionism or obscurantism: "Those who exploit religion to establish 
a Shariah state and struggle with secularism are religious 
reactionaries or obscurantists." Looked from this perspective, 
religious fundamentalism as an enemy of the secular regime is as 
dangerous as communism. Evren (1990d: 102) states: "The goal of 
religious reactionism (irtica) and communism is to abolish the 
secular and democratic parliamentary regime which based on the 
respect for the basic rights and freedoms of human beings." With the 
Islami c resurgence in the Iate 1 980s, Evren concludes that in some 
respects religious reactionism menaces a formidable threat to the 
secular regime and it is much more dangerous than communism 
because the former is retrogressive whereas the latter is progressive 
(Evren, 1990d : 102). What is noteworthy in Evren's approach to 
religious revivalism is that he has always used a very negative 
terminology about religious movements, even not mentioning the 
word of religious fundamentalism but fanaticism, obscurantism 
(nıürteci, yobaz or gericı1. One may infer that this is a dichotomy of 
"gerici" and "ilerici" belonging to the "modernist and progress-
oriented" mind of the Republican elite. 
Stemming from the assumption that religious reactionism 
and underdevelopment are necessarily interwoven, Evren (1987a: 
337) argues that the reason for the advancement of Western 
countries is their success in getting rid of religious reactionism 
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(fanaticism): 'Western countries have fought against fanatic attitudes 
of clergy. They have eventually become successful in breaking the 
chains of underdevelopment but unfortunately we have failed in 
rescuing ourselves from the effects of obscure fanaticism. ll Evren 
further claims that the underlying factor in backwardness of the 
Ottoman Empire is the religious fanaticism by making use of some 
examples from the Ottoman history. Evren (1987: 337) comes up 
with the conclusion that it is the fanatic clergy who caused a delay in 
the introduction and usage of printing, and the same clergy are 
responsible from the failures of the Ottoman armies at war with 
Mehmet Ali Pasha who, for instance, saying that there should not be 
any atta ek on Friday. Evren ( 1983: 81) in his public speeches goes 
further in his accusation of the Ottoman clergy: 11Ünce a time, a 
fatwa was issued that the language of paradise ("will be) is Arabic or 
Persian. That's why some Arabic and Persian words had entered into 
our language. Our many books and poems had been \\rritten or 
com po sed in that language. ll It should be also mention ed that while 
Evren holds clergy responsible for the Ottoman underdevelopment, 
he makes a distinction between religion itself and the clergy. What 
Evren (1987a: 337) underlies is that although religion encourages 
people to seek for science, knowledge even if it is in China, the 
responsible for such underdevelopment are the hodjas (clergy) who 
are willing to have a great say in state affairs. It is interesting to see 
that Evren, as part of his campaign against religious 
fundamentalism, discusses publicly the arguments of Cemaleddin 
Kaplan (3), the former nıufti of Adana and tries to refute Kaplan's 
arguments with his limited knowledge of religion. As a president of 
Turkey Evren with his addressing to Kaplan's fundamentalist 
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arguments, ranging from his aUacks on Atatürk to the acceptance of 
Friday as a holiday, brings the issue of Islamic state into the Turkish 
agenda. It is almost needless to say that this is a novelty that has 
been unprecedented in the history of Republic, the fact remains that 
"if Evren had not mentioned Kaplan's name, this man would have no 
influence." (Mumcu, 1987 : 207) 
Taken as a whole Evren has always considered the military 
as the guardian of the Republic and the principle of secularism 
against any threat of Islamic revolution coming from religious 
fundamentalism, as he states in the following way: "The sole raison 
d'etre of the Turkish Armed Forces is to defend this country as an 
indivisible whole against both its internal and e.x.'iemal enemies" 
{quoted in Heper, 1985: 140). 
2.3 Religion 
Evren (1990b : 33) is a son of medrese (religious school) graduated 
father who did not prefer to be a clergy, but rather a civil servant. 
Evren does not hesitate to emphasize his father's religious origin in 
his public speeches in order to pursue that he is not against Islam 
and pious Muslims, and he makes use of it for his explanations and 
speeches on the subjects related to religion. It seems that, in the 
light of his explanations, in his memoirs, he personally is not a 
practicing Muslim with the exception of his pilgrimage to Mecca (4) in 
1983 as a president which has been unprecedented in the Republic. 
It was forbidden to take photos of his pilgıimage, on the ground that 
it is against the principle of secularism (1990d: 55)" 
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Evren has an understanding of religion that as a unifYing 
and integrating function in a given society. In that respect. it 
provides solidarity, unity and coherence to construct a peaceful and 
just society. Looked at from this particular perspective, religion may 
serve as a guarantee of national unity and survival in case of any 
threat and crisis. Evren (1988: 313) argues: 
Our religion appreciates science and reason, 
suggests the happiness of all humanity and 
harmonious and peaceful living together of 
societies. Our religion has unifying and 
integrating characteristics that are sufficient to 
overcome the several problems and erisis we had 
and we may have [in the future]. These values 
that give an e.h.'iraordinary essence to our religion 
should be protected and practiced not only in the 
days of religious festivals but also in every 
moment of our life with the same enthusiasm. 
care and sensitivity and I believe that this will be 
the main factor at reaching to the enlightened 
days. 
One may conclude that such understanding of religion 
involves a similarity to "Turkish-Islamic Synthesis" which consider 
Islam as a source of solidarity and the antidote against the leftist 
ideologies. A relevant development is that Evren in his public 
speeches, tries to inculcate the moral values and social behaviors he 
considers important for the Turkish public life by reading some 
verses from Qur'an. Evren (1988: 313) refers religion as a source of 
moral values in the fallawing way: " Our religion suggests the 
happiness of all humanity and a harmonious and peaceful living 
together. Islamisa religion that sees everybody as brother and forbid 
disorder, mischief, lie, gossip, and all the other evils. It is the last 
and most perfect religion that brings responsibility to human 
behaviors." Thus, Parla (1991) m ay come up with the daim that 
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Evren's statement about " Turkish histarical and moral values" are 
defined religiously yet indirectly. 
What is more significant in Evren's utilization of religion is 
his attempt to show how Atatürk is religious and not against Islam 
by reading same passages from Atatürk's memoirs. According to 
Evren those who try to present Atatürk as irreligious are the enemies 
of the republic and they indeed are irreligious. Atatürk was a person 
who stated several times that Islam is a most perfect religion and he 
saved Islam from disappearance under the foreign damination 
{l987a: 374). 
Evren employs religious arguments, from Qur'an and the 
sayings (Hadith) of the Prophet Mohammed not only to struggle with 
the misperceptions of the religious rules, superstition and ignorance 
but also to achieve some secular state goals in southern and eastern 
Anatolia. His speeches cover a wide range of subjects are as follows: 
faınily planning, prevention of sex discrimination in education, 
mobilization of literacy, improvement of stock-breeding, organ 
transfer, construction of schools, child health, anarchy and 
terrorism, tooth filling, danger cutting the nails at nights. 
To take an example, Evren does not accept the idea that birth 
control is a sin and prohibited by religion and draws attention to the 
fact that freedam of abortion has given after the military intervention 
ofthe 1980 (Evren, 1987: 4-5). 
Evren is in favor of developing close ties with Islamic 
countries in economy and commercial areas provided that the 
fundamentalist Iran or conservative Islamic regimes will not interfere 
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in the domestic affairs of Turkey. Evren (1988: 367) continues: "We 
are not interested in the political regimes that neighboring countries 
and other Islamic countries adopt to rule their countries. We may 
develop friendship (closer relations) with any country which 
recognizes our national unity and does not intertere with our 
domestic affairs. We do not care whether they are ruled Shariah or 
not." 
Such a pragmatic attitude reveals the undedining ratianale 
for the reason behind Turkey's participation under Evren's 
presideney in the summit meeting of Organization of Islarnic 
Conference (İslanı Konferansı Örgütü) in Saudi Arabia at the level of 
prime ministry instead of foreign rninistry in 1984 and Evren's 
presideney over its economic branch iSEDAK (İslam Ülkeleri 
Ekononıik Danışnıa Kurulu). Thus, Islamic nature of Pakistani State 
did not affect the intimate friendship between Evren and Ziya ul-Hak 
but at the same time, Evren has always put a stress on the economic 
and commercial aspects of developing closer ties with Islarnic 
countries especially in his messages to foreign newspapers he 
assured that Turkey's only interest is economic and commercial, 
nothing else. It should be added that only exception to this policy is 
the Iranian case. Evren has always been suspicious of real intentions 
of the Iranian Islamic regime which aims at spreading the Islamic 
revolution all over the Middle Eastem countries. One may conclude 
that Evren's approach towards Iran has two aspects, namely 
domestic and foreign. In foreign aspect, Evren has considered Iranian 
revolution as an intemal matter of Iranian people since the military 
takeover of 12th September (Evren, 1981: 40) and it has nothing to 
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dowith the economic relations between Turkey and Iran. In domestic 
aspect, Evren has severely criticized the regime in Iran for pursuing 
an offensive policy against the Turkish secular regime and 
supporting reactionary movements in Turkey (Evren, l990c: 16). For 
Evren Iran's aim is therefore the dissolution of the Turkish secular 
state and its replacement by a fundamentalist one, similar to 
Khomeini regime. 
Some statements made by Iranian State offıcials, Khomeini, 
against Atatürk irritates him and Evren (l990d: 469) uses then 
harsh words about the Iranian regime and Khomeini: 'You 
[Khomeini] have destroyed Iran and push it back for at least 40-50 
years." He mak es a contrast between Atatürk and Khomeini: 
"Atatürk has elevated the Turkish nation which had tended to 
disappear to a level that it had enjoyed a dignity in the world. You, 
by contrast, will be noted in the pages of history as a leader who has 
retrogressed a nation." Evren makes a use of religion in these 
subjects: 
(1) Sectarianism Evren evinces his faremost cancem in the 
employment of religion for the reduction of tensions between Alawi 
and Sunni sects, attempting to close the gap between these two sects 
by underlying the unifying the nature of Islam and secularism as 
well. Division of Alawi-Sunni is an affair of those who want to break 
our country into the pieces and Evren (1990a: 223) continues: 'You 
must never permit sectarianism. Our religion does not accept 
sectarianism, there is no place for sectarianism in Islam. So that I 
call out from here, my citizens whichever sect or order you belong to, 
embrace each other, kiss each others, we are the children of the 
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same religion." Evren overemphasizes a sense of belonging to the 
same religion by making an argument that: "Separation between 
Alawis and Sunnis emerged as a result of conflict among the 
Prophet's friends and it is their affairs that we do not have anything 
to dowith their conflict." (1983: ı 97- ı 98} 
Evren calls both teachers and religious scholars (clergy} to 
struggle against sectarianism and come to the conclusion that there 
is no place for division in religion like Sunnism or Alawiism: 
Teachers and scholars have to bear on important 
duty starting from schools, they should teach our 
children that we are brothers and belonging to 
the same religion -you may not find any division 
such as Sunnism, Alawiism, Bektashiism and 
Nurculuk in our religion. Those who are making 
such a discrimination are committing a sin." 
(Evren, ı983: ı97-ı98}. 
Evren (ı990d : 226} denounces sectarianism which is an 
obstacle to the national unity and cooperation andputsan emphasis 
on secularism as the principle which has been the guarantee for the 
national unity by making a quotation: 
As Atatürk said: 'the success of a nation is 
possible if the all national forces come into 
existence on the same direction.' Therefore w e 
may say that the success we have had until know 
comes from the cooperation and the comman 
action of national forces. If we want to repeat the 
same success and victories in the future, we 
should keep the same principle and walk 
together. 
Atatürk has brought secularism to the countıy for the 
national unity and cooperation. Evren believes that with the principle 
of secularism, people may start to live the true religion of Islam. In 
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the Islamic world the only countıy that has been following the path 
of science, reason, and enlightenment is Turkey which has showed 
the courage and insight to seeularize her law, education and state 
system (Evren, 1990d: 226). In that respect, Turkey represents today 
an exceptional political model combining society and secular 
democracy together. 
(2) Reformation of Religion Evren seems to be interested in the 
debate about reformation of religion, though his interest has been a 
pragmatic one. He has voiced his views in order to present counter 
arguments against women students who wear head scarves or some 
fundamentalist calls for a return to Arabic alphabet and an 
implementation of Shariah laws in the countıy. He has expressed 
interest in the reformist interpretations of the verses about veiling, 
usuıy (faiz), the language of Qur'an and its translation, and of 
slaveıy. According to Evren, (1983: 31-32) Atatürk was the person 
who had foreseen the need of modern interpretations and reforms in 
religion. Furthermore, Evren (1983: 31-32) suggests that Islam as a 
social institution should be accorded to the needs of modern life and 
should be kept pace with change: "There are some verses related to 
slaveıy, in Qur'an. At that time, there was [the phenomenon of] 
slaveıy. Is it possible now? Do we create slaveıy due to these verses? 
There are some religious rules that is not possible to implement them 
in this centuıy" (Evren, 1983: 33). On the subject ofveiling: ''There is 
no order of but recommendation of God about covering women's 
heads. If we accept all written verses in Qur'an as an order, then we 
ought to have male and female slaves at our homes" (Evren, 1983: 
34). Evren interprets the verses related to covering women's heads in 
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a different way than the orthodox understanding of Islam. He cannot 
fınd any statement which orders women to cover their heads in 
Ahzab Sura (verse 59) and Nur Sura (verses 30-31 ). Evren (1988: 
212-213) claims that, those who cut Islam into parts, sects and 
orders, misinterpreted these verses and forced women to cover all of 
their bodies including their heads and even faces. In addition, there 
is no rule in Islam according to which woman should stay at home 
and not work and women should wear a çarşaf (women's outdoor 
overgarnment) (Evren, 1985: 16; l990a: 482-484; l990d: 152). 
Evren argues that the prohibition of interest which is stili 
valid in Islamic countries should be abolished again on the basis of 
requirements of modern financial life, for this prohibition causes 
difficulties in transactions on an international scales. Muslim 
scholars and scientists should come together and find a solution. In 
fact, circles who defend the continuation of this prohibition do not 
take notice of extreme profits which should be also forbidden by 
religion like interest. And they, because of their fanaticism, opposed 
to interest while keeping silent on extremely high profits. 
It is possible to suggest that Evren gives assent to Kemalist 
efforts to reform religion and relate it to science and reason. For 
example, to Evren there is no difference between "Allahu Ekber" and 
''Tann Uludur" the latter is even better for it is Turkish. Evren does 
not approve the political elite's appeal to the masses on the issue of 
religion for electoral concerns. With this line of reasoning, he blames 
the Democrat Party government, namely Adnan Menderes and Celal 
Bayar as making concessions to obscurantism by changing the call 
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to prayer from Turkish to Arabic, with the aim of exploiting religion 
for political purposes (Evren, 1990b: 89). 
(3) Religious Education and Instruction Even though Evren (1981: 
17) criticizes Erbakan in his news conference of 16 September 1980 
for believing modern, secular education turned students into 
anarchists, he, together with some politicians of the right, is 
convinced that the best way to neutralize the politicization in the 
country is Islamic indoctrination (not practice). That is why as 
indicated earlier in this chapter, the military regime of 1980-83 
included in the Constitution the provision that education and 
instruction in religion and ethics should be made a compulsory part 
of the curriculum of all primary and secondary schools. Some argues 
that the inclusion of these courses to the curriculum is a repudiation 
of Atatürk's reforms and principle of secularism and this act is a 
populist inciination of military regime to get public support. 
(Kahraman, 1989: 110) 
Evren, in an answer to the claims that the military regime 
aims to socialize the youth in an Islamic way through religious 
courses, legitimizes the compulsory religious education by Atatürk's 
sentences, pointing to the necessity of religion as an institution: 'W e 
do not have clergy, we all are equals and we have to learn the orders 
of our religion in equality. Every individual need sornewhere to learn 
their religion and faith, that is at school. Religion is a necessary 
institution and there is no possibility for the survival of the 
unbelieving nations" (Evren, 1988: 29). To him compulsory religious 
education, is not essential contrary to secularism, saves religious 
education from non competent and obscurantist fanatic circles. 
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These causes are necessary to abolish the monopoly of reactionary 
circles. In religious education, people will become enlightened by the 
true knowledge of religion, and by that superstition and 
misperception of religion \Vill be disappeared. 
Evren (1990c: 77; 1987b: 25) also defends his citation of 
verses from Qur'an and the saying of the Prophet by the same token: 
I recite some verses from Qur'an for encouraging 
my citizens to read the Turkish translations of 
verses. If citizens read the Turkish translations 
of verses by themselves, they will be saved from 
many [mislead] interpretations of fanatic clergy 
(hodjas). I recite those verses in order to explain 
my citizens that there is no coercion in religion 
and no place for sex discrimination, to protect the 
people who are addicted to drinking, smoking 
and gambling from these harmful habits, not 
because of my obscurantism. 
The increase in the number of schools to train prayer leaders 
and preachers (the Imam-Hatip Schools) in another subject that 
Evren is criticized. Evren argues that these schools do not represent 
the centers for religious reactionary attitudes but instead they have 
been established to train enlightened modem religious clergy. He 
rejects the daim that the number of Imam-Hatip Schools increased 
sharply during the military government's three year from 250 to 50 
(Ahmad, 1193: 219) and only three Imam-Hatip Schools have been 
allowed to be constructed in his presideney as well. Despite Evren's 
soft attitude towards Imam-Hatip Schools, he had been also worried 
the appointment of Imam-Hatip School graduates to the posts of 
ministıy of education and has vetoed Özal's govemments' decrees 
about the appointment of such graduates. As the weekly Nokta 
(March 26, 1989) published the report of the military regime on 
57 
religion, these religious schools has been perceived as a unifYing 
factor in Alawii-populated areas such as Tunceli to integrate them 
through Sunni Islamic education. And again Evren permitted t..lıe 
Rabita organization to pay the salaries of Turkish officials from the 
Directorate of Religious Affairs sent to Europe so that Turkish 
Workers would not be influenced by harmful ideologies. It is 
assumed that if state does not provide religious services and 
education, those who demand reestablish an Islamic State based on 
the rules of Shariah will fıll this vacuum and mislead people's 
religious beliefs. 
(4) Religious Groups and Orders The 1982 Constitution and other 
post-1980 legislation taken under the military govemment represent 
a significant attempt toward de politicization coupled with the state 
control, legally and institutionally, over the civil society in Turkey. 
The Constitution rejects a major premise of pluralist democracy, 
namely the representation of interests through links between 
political parties and interest groups. It does alsa not include the 
principle which was implicit in the 1960 Constitution, that 
institutions of civil society are autonomous from the state. 
Seen in this light, it would not be incorrect to say that Evren 
does not cansicler religious communities and orders as legal and 
legitimate. It is not acceptable to regard these groups as pressure or 
interest groups of a democratic regime. Still he employs the 
diehatamy of the "ilerici-gerici" when he acidresses to them, namely, 
to Nurcular, Süleymancılar or Nakshibendis and so on. Contrary to 
the daim that there was a state support to those groups during 
military regime, Evren has been committed to fight against them as 
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obscurantist movements. He, asa president prevented the opening of 
Bezm-i Alem University which was claimed under the control of 
fundamentalist circles and even Evren complains about soft 
treatment of judiciaıy towards these religious groups. Some 
Süleymancılar were imprisoned during militaıy regime (Evren, 
l990c: 75). 
It is interesting to see that Evren does not name these 
religious communities and orders as Islamic fundamentalists but 
calls obscurantists, retrogressive. Evren does not legitimize religious 
groups and orders by referring them as the elements of, for instance, 
civil society. In that sense, he has not revised the Republican 
attitude towards orders, stili calling them as "gerici" (obscurantist). 
Evren expressed fears for the infiltration of religious 
e:x'iremists into the army forces "some religious groups and orders 
have been indoctrinated by them, up to that time, have been taken to 
militaıy schools. These students, in ten or fifteen years, will become 
hattalion commander or regiment commander and they may drag the 
countıy to the regime by controlling the army" (l990c: 21). In a 
meeting of the National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Konseyı), he 
proposes to appropriate the private dormitories in which religious 
groups "indoctrinates students to permeate into state institutions 
and the army forces". Note the fact that many cadets have been 
expelled from militaıy academies for their Islamic activities or 
religious affiliation. On the subject of recruitment to the militaıy, 
Evren says that those who graduated from the religiously oriented 
high schools (Imam-Hatip Schools) could not become army officers. 
Evren also believes that women students' insistence in refusing to lift 
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their scarves during school hours is because of their Muslim 
militancy and supported by foreign fundamentalist organizations. 
The wearing of head scarves represents a common political action 
taken by religious reactionaries against the secular regime and a 
symbol of desire for establishing a Shariah state (1987a: 375). 
2.4 On Özal Govemments 
The 1982 Constitution in effect, concentrates power in the hands of 
the President. According to the Article 103, the President is 
responsible for the safeguarding of the security and the 
independence of the country, the indivisibility and the integrity of the 
nation, the unconditional sovereignty of the people, the rule of law, 
democracy, secular Republic guided by the tenets and reforms of 
Atatürk and human rights and public welfare. The President is also 
granted extensive legislative and executive powers. The President 
may veto legislations passed by the parliament and challenge the 
legal decree of the cabinet, by appealing to the Constitutional Court. 
(4) 
This empowerment of the office of Presideney is in conformity 
with the nature of the state that: "The military envisaged for the third 
Turkish Republic -a partially transcendental state-" (Heper, 1985: 
140). This fact is reinforced by Evren's statement: 'We cannot reduce 
the state to a petty-entity subservient to the law of associations. The 
office of the state cannot be relegated to that of a master of 
ceremonies." 
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Evren, with such a concentration of power in his han ds, often 
intervened in government's affairs and manipulated Özal, Prime 
Minister, with the exception of economic matters. As seen in the 
memoirs of Evren, one of the really serious points of conflict between 
Özal governments and President appears to be on religious issues 
and the Motherland Party's cultivation of elements of fundamentalist 
support. Keeping in mind, Evren advised Özal, during Özal's 
attempts to establish a new political party, not to include persons 
related to defunct National Action Party (MHP) and the National 
Salvation Party (MSP). 
The President objected and prevented the appointment of 
higher public servants, of persons associated with former extreme 
right wing parties or graduated from lmam-Hatip Schools. Evren 
asked also for alternative names to consider when rati(ying 
appointment of minisiers -in some cases, the pressures made by 
President Evren had been the main reason for the exclusion for 
Mehmet Keçeciler and Vehbi Dinçerler from Özal's cabinet. They were 
associated with the Motherland Party's religious faction. President 
Evren criticizes Vehbi Dinçerler, said to be a member of the 
Nakshibendi order, for Dinçerler's decision to include Arabic 
language courses in the curriculum of secondaıy schools and his 
suggestions about religious instruction in primaıy and secondaıy 
schools should be converted to applied courses to teach the 
performance of Namaz (daily prayers). Evren also warned Özal about 
Dinçerler for the appointment of some Imam-Hatip School graduates 
to the posts of his ministıy (l990d: 259-260). The han of beer 
advertisements on national radio and television and the long dress of 
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female students during the National Sports Day of May 1984, Evren 
considered as concessions to fundamentalists, had been among the 
other reasons for the exclusion of Dinçerler from Özal's cabinet 
(1990d: 259-260). Dinçerler's decision to include several publications 
such as 'Yemek Adabı" (rules of good manners for dinner) written by 
Nakshibendi Sheikh, Mehmet Zahid Kotku was the last drop in the 
glass that led to his resignation from the cabinet. 
Evren did not approve of Özal's govemment's decisions to 
built places of worship (mescid} within both the Grand National 
Assembly and various ministries. In addition, Evren vetoed a bill 
passed by parliament in November 1988 allowing freedom of dress 
for all students and faculty members in universities. \Vhen the 
govemment insisted on sending the bill to the president for the 
second time, Evren applied to the court of Constitution for the 
annulment of the law about the allowance of the wearing of head 
scarves (Evren, 1990d: 387). 
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NOTES 
(1) Article 2 read "Title Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular 
and social state governed by the rule of law: bearing in mind the 
concept of public peace, natural solidarity and justice; respecting 
human rights; loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk and based on the 
fundamental tenets set forth in the Preamble. 
(2) Evren, in his memoirs, states that "Kubilay was martyred by the 
religious reactionaries in 1930. This event exerted an intensive 
influence on me and my friends (1990b: 32). 
(3) Cemaleddin Kaplan is a leader of an extreme part of religious 
fundamentalism in Turkey. He lives in \Vest Germany as a political 
refugee. He has started a campaign against the secular regime in 
Ankara which he hopes to destroy. He hopes to bring down the 
Turkish republic by following Khomeini's strategy of infılirating 
sound and video cassettes of his sermons into the country, exposing 
the masses to the ideas of the Islamic state. He intends to wage his 
struggle against secularism through the mosque rather than a 
political party which is contradictory to the fundamentals of Islam. 
Mumcu who interviewed him dismisses Kaplan's ability to carry out 
an Islamic revolution in Turkey (Mumcu, 1987: 207). He later 
declared Anadolu Federe İslam Cumhuriyeti as an exile-government 
ofTurkey in West Germany. 
(4) For further detail on the office of the Presideney in 1982 
Constitution, see Heper (1985: 141-148); Özbudun, 1993, Turk 
Anayasa Hukuku, Yetkin Yayınlan 3. ed., 1993 Ankara and the 
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status of the President of the Republic under the Turkish 
Constitution of 1982: Presidentialism and Parliamentarism in Heper 
and Evin eds, State, Democracy and the Militaıy Turkey in 1980s. 
1988, New York: Walter de Gruyter. And see also Parla, Tiirkiye'de 
Anayasalar 1991, İletişim, Istanbul. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ÖZAL'S CONCEPTUALIZATION OF SECULARISM 
3.1. Transition to Civilian Politics 
The militaıy leadership which assumed political power in September 
1980 identifıed the political parties, their leaders, even the party 
system as a major contributor to the domestic crisis, terrorism and 
eroding public authority which existed prior to intervention. (Turan, 
1988: 68) One of the major concern of the militaıy regime \Yas to set 
up a new basis for the establishment and functioning of civilian 
politics and political party system. Therefore, the principles which 
\vill guide the functioning of parties are indicated both in the 
Constitution and the Law o the Political Parties. The general 
provisions directing political parties to abide by the central values of 
the Republic are summarized in Article 68: " The by-laws and 
programs of political parties may not be in conflict with the 
principles of national unity and the territorial integrity of the state, 
human rights, national sovereignty and the demecratic and the 
secular character of the Republic." Articles 5 and 78, 90 of the Law of 
the Political Parties defıne the scope of political parties. Communist 
parties and parties arrested toward religious distinctions, ethnic 
separatism and the racial differences are not allowed to exist in the 
party system (Turan, 1988: 69) (1). 
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Shortly after the ban on political activity was repeated, some 
new parties made their appearance on the Turkish political scene. 
Only three parties. The Nationalisi Democracy Party and the Populist 
Party which were formed with the encouragement of the militaıy 
Ieadership as the main parties of the left and the right and the 
Motherland Party of Turgut Özal. Özal, a Deputy of Prime Minister 
during ı 980- ı 982, were allowed to parti ci pa te in the elections. 
Despite President Evren's last minute attack on Özal, the Motherland 
Party won a solid victoıy in the elections of October ı 983, with 2 ı ı 
seats in the parliament. 
The Motherland Party featured the four tendencies, 
conservative, nationalisi liberal and social democratic which Özal 
said, gave his party its philosophical character and it was not the 
continuation of any of the dissolved parti es. Özal (ı 99 ı a: 305) argues 
that the Motherland Party took general reconciliation as its starting 
point, rejecting the dichotomy of left-right inherited from the past 
and had no relevance to the present. It accepted into its ranks 
adherents of old movements in order to form a new synthesis. In fact, 
as Ergüder (ı988: 5) argues, in terms of former political associations, 
Özal was personally occupied a space in Turkish politics sornewhere 
between the moderate and more secular right of the Justice Party 
vintage and the religious right of the NSP. Özal's Motherland Party 
provided a broadly acceptable, pro-system alternative, neutralizing 
and reintegrating the anti-systemic tendendes of the right and the 
periphery (Ergüder, ı988: 99) 
Özal (1984: ı60-ı6ı; ı988: 9) defınes the Motherland Party 
in his several speeches as a political organization is committ.ed itself 
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to nationalism, conservatism, social justice and free market economy 
based on free competition as it is indicated in the party program and 
in his several speeches. 
According to Özal, (l989a: 327) the formation of the MP goes 
back to the beginning of the reform movements of the Ottoman 
Empire and draws its strength from the Ottoman reforms, the war of 
independence, Atatürk reforms and the Democrat Party (2), 
excluding the status quo periods. Thus, as a continuation of such an 
innovative movement, the MP has realized the goals of 
Westernization reforms so that Turkey has no further need of 
reforms. The economic reforms achieved by the Motherland Party 
were the last reforms to be needed. Özal (199la: 311), implied that 
the Kemalist goal of elevating the people to the level of modern 
civilization has been accomplished. 
As one of the three fundamental principles of the Motherland 
Party [conservatism-nationalism, liberalism (free market) and social 
justice], conservatism is not a fanaticism, rather respect for tradition, 
histoıy and beliefs and protecting the best traditional values that are 
in conformity with the present conditions of civilization. The foremost 
concern of such conservatism is of course the strengthening of family 
which also reveals the reason for the establishment of the ministıy of 
family (Özal, 1989a: 330). 
Moreover, Özal (l989a: 750) states that the MP's 
understanding of social justice is based on national and spiritual 
qualities which inherited from the past, not derived from the 
socialists in the West, reminding the saying of the Prophet: "He, who 
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sleeps while his neighbor is hungıy, is not with us" and continues: 
"the principle of social justice takes place in our beliefs and manner 
of life" (1985:220). 
It is patent that the philosophy of the MP based on religion, 
in Özal's mind at least, not contraıy to religion: "\Vhat we (the MP) 
have done until today is not contraıy to our religion, Islam. We have 
already deriveda lot of principles from religion." Islam started to take 
place alongside science as a source for the MP's some public policies. 
As Göle (1993: 29) points out that Özal developed "a synthesis 
between Islamic identity and pragmatic rationality of engineering" 
through reconciling cultural values with the requisites of economic 
development. In fact, the Motherland Party with its four tendencies. 
c:onservative (religious), nationalist, social democratic and liberal 
factions, came into existence as an example of such synthesis. 
To be noted the fact that the religious group within the 
Motherland Party influenced the government's decisions in a way 
that secular circles such as the SDPP (Social Democratic Populist 
Party) and the media called "creeping Islamicization of the state" 
(Briefing, 29 October, 1990). The religious faction within the 
Motherland govemınenis introduced some Islamicization policies as 
in the case of Vehbi Dinçerler's Ministıy of Education, Youth and 
Sports said to be full of the NSP sympathizers (3). As discussed in 
chapter two, it is clear that Dinçerler made religiously based 
decisions on the issue of education. The most controversial of his 
decisions concerned his ban on the teaching of Darwin's theoıy in 
primaıy and secondaıy schools as a sign of Islamicization of the text 
books. The long shorts for female students during the National 
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Sports Day of May 1984. the ban of beer advertisement on national 
radio and television, inclusion of Arabic courses in the curriculum of 
secondary schoo]s, his decision to have the textbooks rewritten by a 
commission which censored modern Turk words and emphasized the 
leading political and military figures of the early Republican period 
who were known for their religious opposition to the Kemalist regime 
and the introduction of Muslim philosophy in the texts were other 
religiously based policies ofVehbi Dinçerler. 
In addition, the SDPP openly accusing the Matberiand Party 
governments, in the Iate 1980's, of staying silent in view of the 
fundamentalist infiltration of the Turkish Police Force and the 
Interior Ministry while other state organizations were also taking a 
turn towards Jslamicism. The SDPP parliamentarians charged that 
the lnterior Ministıy and the Turkish Police had fallen under the 
control of Nakshibendi leaders Sheikh Raşit Erol and Sheikh 
Abdullah and the minister, Aksu was involved in activities to 
promote a religious state orderin Turkey (Briefing, 29 October, 1990) 
(4). 
The proposal of the conservative members of parliament from 
the MP to turn existing Qur'an schools into middle schools within the 
state system during Avni Akyol's ministry of Education was another 
attempt and demonstrated the religious commitment of the MP. 
(Briefing, 6 May, 1991) 
The MP governments were also criticized for showing a 
reluctance in the investigation of the assassination of Muammer 
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Aksoy, Turan Dursun, Çetin Emeç, Bahriye Üçok, said to be 
murdered by religious fundamentalists. 
3.2 The Notion of Secularism 
Özal (1991a: 311; 1991b: 13; 1993a: 98) considers three 
fundamental freedoms as sine qua non for Turkey's being a great 
civilized and civilizing power once again, namely freedom of thought 
and speech, freedom of religion and freedom of enterprise. These 
three freedoms have an important place in the ideas of Özal, starting 
from his formulation of "The Principles of New Outlook in the 
Development" (Kalkınmada Yeni Görüşün Esaslan) submitted to 
Nationalists' Smail Congress (Milliyetçiler Küçük Kunıltayı) in 1979 
in Ankara. To Özal, (1989: 387) these three freedoms which are given 
by God as natural freedoms should not be put under pressure, if 
they are under pressure, human being cannot develop his qualities 
and no possibility for the advancement of society. These freedoms 
will reveal the essence of Turkish people granted by God, in a proper 
sense and that is the way of development. 
Özal (199lb: 15) believes that the freedom of religion is the 
symbol and the indicator of human love and respect to other human 
beings in a universal level and sense, keeping in mind the developed 
countries who have the daim and will of being secular and 
democratic are the countries that have already embraced his 
freedom. People who are not in the pressures pertaining to religion 
and conscience has the will and ability to work hard, to earn much 
and to live happily with their beliefs. Özal states that the guarantee 
of the freedom of religion is secularism and adding the fact that 
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seculaıism and the freedoru of religion are the raison d'etre and the 
protector of each other. 
Özal as a prime minister, expressed his views on seculaıism 
in one meeting of National Secuıity Council: 
Seculaıism has been misinterpreted by some 
circles. Some people understands seculaıism as 
unbelieving or atheism. We define seculaıism in 
the following way: no one can interfere with 
anyone. We do not permit anyone to interfere in 
the state affairs. We, the Motherland Party, are 
struggling with the Prospeıity Party and the 
National Action Party which are against the state. 
(Evren, 1990d: 441} 
With his commitment to the pıinciple of secularism, Özal 
(1991a: 293} interprets Turkish eA."Peıience with seculaıism in two 
different ways. First, he points to a quite unexpected result of the 
radical secularization, "deifıcation of the state" by attıibuting to it 
certain divine characteıistics. Özal (1991b: 293} further continues by 
reminding the seculaıism (or atheism} of the communist countıies: 
'The cost of replacement of God by state, and reJigion by ideology, 
which had been seen as a histoıic progress of reason against 
'superstition', was catastrophic." In fact, Özal has been always 
cıitical about the huge role of state in Turkey, beginning with "the 
New Outlook in the Development" as a technocrat in 1979 to his 
"Second Transformatian Program" as a president in 1992. In the 
Third İzmir Congress on Economy (June 4, 1992}, he deseribed the 
decade of the 80's as one in which " the mentality placing the state 
above the individual died away." One part of the Second 
Transformatian Program is the minimization of the s ta te. Özal ( 1993: 
158) proposes a servant state dealing only with matters of secuıity, 
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bw :ı.nd oı-dcr, and n:ı.tional defense. Özal's minimal state was to 
limit itself to engaging in infrastructure serYices as far as the 
economy was concerned. Özal also argued for privatization in 
education which means the abolishment of the Republican practice 
of unified education (Teı'iıid-i Tedris:ıt). Lool\ed from this perspective, 
Özal is in favor of the reduction of state iıwolvement in religious 
issues, for instance, leaving the Presideney of Religious Affairs 
(Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) to religious communities. According to 
him, secularism should be discussed publidy, and \\ithout 
discussion such issues may not be properly understood and 
practiced. Özal's nttitude is evidently open to redefine secularism. 
and freedom of religion nnd conscience. Özal (Zaman, 20 Jnnuary, 
1992) discusses the nature and definition of secularism in Turkey 
;.d1en he pays particular attention to the eritic rebtionship between 
religion nnd politics: "There will be an increase in the number of 
people who have religious inciinntion \\ith this new trend towards 
religion all over the world. This should not be exploited. Thnt would 
be the most dangerous case. \Ve hnve to establish the relntionship 
between religion and politics in a correct way." 
Özal (Zaman. 20 January, l 992) further questions the nnture 
of Turkish secubrism as sepan:ı.tion of state and religion by making n 
reference to the Presideney of Religious Affairs: "I am thinking about 
\\'hether we nıay change the status of the Presideney of Religious 
Affairs. \Ve are secular but at the sane time, we have a religious 
organization (within the state) that its president is being appointed 
by govenıment. Is this correc1? Should we leave it to religious 
nmıınunities? How can we do this?" 
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The second way in which Özal appreciates Turkish 
secularism is related to the positive effects of secularism on faith. To 
Özal, what was not foreseen in Turkey was the ultimate affect of 
limiting the powers of religious institutions in the areas of law and 
justice would be gradually but steadily to reinforce faith in God. Özal 
(199la: 293) continues: " With secularization reforms religion 
became internalized, concentrated in the souls of the faithful and 
expressed through prayer. Turks became as pious and devout in 
their personal lives as they were secular in their public lives. It is a 
phenomenon that some \Vesterners seeasa return to religion." 
Thus, the revival of religion which startedin the Iate 1940s is 
not a deviation from the principle of secularism. In fact, what is 
taking place is a more "normalization after a revolutionary 
secularism." Özal does not share the fear that the threat of religious 
fundamentalism (irtica) is increasing in Turkey. He believes that 
Turkish people has always been devoted to their religion and 
traditions and this should not be understood as religious fanaticism 
or fundamentalism. It is not possible for Turkey to go back: 'We do 
not think that religious fundamentalism may gain strength in 
Turkey. Turkish people that we have known and received votes, will 
not allow such a thing. Okay, there are some incidents which are in 
essence, not in accordance with our religion but it is not possible to 
generalize such events. These are the acts and actions of smail 
fundamentalist groups which can be encountered in Westem 
societies as well" (Evren, 1990d: 296). 
Özal holds that the underlying reason behind the revival of 
religion in Turkey is the movement towards democracy where the 
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voice of the people began to make itself heard. Özal (1991a: 295) 
further argues that the revival of religious feeling may paradoxically 
signi(y the growing maturity of Turkish secularism because a return 
to religion has taken place in a phase in which the "respective realms 
of religion and reason have been delineated and equilibrium 
established." What is more significant in Özal's (1991 a: 291) stress 
on the positive affects of the revival of religion is his argument that 
the return of individuals to the faith ended "the deification of the 
state." The omnipotent state gave way to the functional s ta te and the 
citizens regained their individuality and the spirit of enterprise 
appeared. (1991 a: 296) He argues that: "the rebirth of an ardent 
religious belief within a secular environment re-established in society 
a just scale of values which assumed its progress in a balanced 
manner." Interestingly enough, Özal here develops an understanding 
of religious faith as a liberator force from a divine state: "Religious 
faith reduces the role of the state while inculcating a sense of 
freedam and responsibility in the ordinary people, because it does 
not attribute divine powers to the state" (Özal, 1991a: 297). 
Özal (1991a: 297) makes a reference to Ghazali's distinction 
between faith and reason, in his effort to demonstrate that Turkey 
has never abandoned secularism, as an early sign of secularism in 
Muslim history. Özal (1991a: 297) arrives ata conclusion that: "The 
Turk is aware that faith, in itself, does not affect secularism, nor 
does it prevent him from being rational, provided that their 
respective realms are not encroached. In life today there is no 
difference in this respect between the Christian European and the 
Muslim Turk." This is a synthesis which has put an en d to the 
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identity erisis of Turk. between the Vvest and Islam (Özal, 199ıa: 
297}. 
Given this intellectual context, one may contend that Özal 
has a different amalgamation of democracy and secularism than 
strict secularism of the military regime of 1980-ı983 and Evren. In 
his mind, the revival of religion in the forms of the wearing of head 
scarves, growing role of religious orders in politics, the recruitment of 
army officers from religious people, the increase in the number of 
Imam-Hatip schools are the subjects of democratization or of 
minimization of divine powers of the state not of secularism. In that 
line of reasoning, it is not strange to see that Özal opened the way to 
universities for the graduates of Imam-Hatip schools (Gökmen, ı992: 
ı 5) and became the prim e minister of the government that abrogated 
the article of ı 63. 
At the same time, Özal govemment passed a bill from the 
parliament In November ı 988 which allowed freedom of dress for all 
students and faculty members and later that bill has been abrogated 
by the Constitutional Court upon application by the President Evren. 
Özal considers the wearing of head scarves by women students 
within the framework of freedoms. In this sense to forbid the wearing 
of head scarves is fanaticism and primitiveness. 
Once upon a time, we repelled our daughters, 
who wear head scarves. That was wrong. Turkey 
is not and should not be such primitive. I shall 
articulate in a clear way that this is a matter of 
respect for decisions of human beings. This is her 
belief and there should be respect for her beliefs. 
On the other side, you cannot interfere with 
others who do not wear head scarves. (Özal, 
ı993b: 230) 
75 
The another subject that considers within the framework of 
freedoms and democratization is the exclusion of army officers from 
the military, who were accused of having connections with religious 
groups and ord ers. In October 1991, President Özal encouraged 
t.hese army officers to apply to the European Court of Justice. He 
also drew an attention to the fact that the decisions of High Council 
of military are out of civilian judicial supervision and in order to 
prevent these sufferings there should be amendments in the 
constitution (Zanıan, 5 October, 1991). 
Özal's democratization program also include permitting the 
formatian of political parties which calls for a shariah state: "here 
may be pro-shariah parties we should be ready for it."( Tiirkiye 15 
March. 1993). Özal (Hüniyet, 3 March, 1990) differentiates being 
secular for individuals and for the state, indicating that he is not 
secular but a pious Muslim, secularism is peculiar to the state. 
As related to Turkish experience with secularism, Özal 
discuss-es the concept of Westemization and modemization, 
emphasizing that they are different from each other. In his view, 
Westernization means resemblance in culture, art, way of life and 
technology to a western nation, but modemization of a nation's living 
with its spirit within western technology and science. Japan, at a 
level of modem civilization, lives as a Japan With its own culture. 
Özal (1985: 220) continues: 'We may benefıt from the science and 
technology of modem civilization while living and thinking as a Turk. 
This does not cut our ties with our history and culture. Culture is 
national whereas technology and science is international with an 
emphasis on the clash of cultures. Although Özal (1986: 282) in his 
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speeches abroad overemphasizes the great importance that Turkey 
attaches to universal values of western civilization, he also talks 
about a gradually "evolving synthesis of two undercurrents," namely 
western vocation and historic religious values of the people. 
Özal interprets the adoption of secularism in Turkey in a 
critica! way. He states that the adoption of secularism following the 
foundation of the Republic represented a clear break with the 
Ottoman and Islamic past. Although the void was partially filled by 
pre-Islamic culture a thousand years old, this pre-Islamic culture 
was unable to take root. Özal (199la: 270) argues that the secular 
reforms, in some aspects, brought "cultural impoverishment." A 
typical example of this impoverishment is the reform of the Turkish 
language. Even it was easier to understand the new national 
language, it had lost much of its capacity to transmit a culture. Özal 
(l99la: 271) concludes that "the erisis of identity" in Turkey has 
been exacerbated by the rejection of the historic and traditional 
component of the culture and its medium, i.e. the language. He 
actually criticizes the Turkish secular experiment in the following 
w ay: 
In the absence of a strong and well-defıned sense 
of national identity [because language reform 
narrowed the bases of it] the westernizing reforms 
not only failed to achieve political modernization 
and economic development to the desired extent 
but, at the same time, by further alienating the 
traditional elements and the masses from the 
modernization process, they created a deep-
rooted polarization in the society. (1991: 272) 
When he compares the modernization experiences of Japan 
and Turkey, Özal (1991a: 271) states that the cultural vision of the 
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Republic has been unduly constıicted in the modernization process 
which resulted in a nation-siate by reduction, disintegration of the 
Ottoman Empire. 
3.3 Religion 
Özal is a son of a father who studied religious courses for sixteen 
years in medrese and served as a clergyman. Despite his father's 
religious background, Özal learned to pray during his university 
education. His mother, a modern secular teaeber of the Republic, 
later turned to religion and became a follower of Nakshibendi order. 
To Özal, Islam as a religion had been veıy successful from its birth to 
the 12th century and the Islamic countıies had been the advanced 
ones in the world, reminding the fact that Islam contıibuted to the 
Renaissance in the West. It is not ıight to attribute the beginning of 
rationalism in Europe to those who fled from Constantinople after 
Turkish conquest. Islam played the decisive role in this respect (Özal, 
1991a : 284). The West have expeıienced the Industıial Revolution 
and Muslim world have failed in adopting to it its development. With 
the industıial revolution, the Western countıies had dominated and 
colonized all Afıica and most of the Muslim countıies. This 
exploitation also explains the current ıichness of the West. 
Özal ( 1991 a: 291) do es not share the Kemalist perception of 
religion which regarded religion as the most seıious obstacle to the 
process of modernization and as a conservative and reactionaıy force 
which had been responsible for the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. 
Özal believes that, in fact, the decline and the fall of the Ottoman 
Empire did not really have anything to do with religion. Rather, it 
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was simply that being part of a whole that was in decline, religious 
institutions could not avoid dedining too. "It was an affect rather 
than a cause, but the pervasiveness of the religion in society made 
its decline more apparent." Özal (l993b: 232) believes that the cause 
of underdevelopment of Islamic countries does not stern froın the 
principles of Islam but from our understanding of religion: 
Islam made a huge expansion within 23 years of 
the Prophet and realized a social transformatian 
as a spread of fire. Islam transformed not only 
the mentioned country, but also all the societies 
which Islam made a contact and Islam gave a 
dynamism to all these societies. That is the power 
of Islam to transform, to modify but if it is 
understood ina correct way (Özal, 1993b: 232). 
Özal (1993b: 233) talks about three different understandings 
of Islam, making a reference to an Islamic thinker Abdurrahman 
Fırat. The first is the one in the minds of people, the second is the 
one in the minds of theological students (nıullah) and the last is 
Islam that Qur'an aims to reach. In the people's Islam, to him, there 
are some traditions, superstition and different perceptions and 
mullah's Islam has been the Sword of Democles above the heads of 
the intellectual groups. Özal emphasizes that the genuine Islam is 
the one which Qur'an aims to get. 
Özal ( 1993b: 231) visualize s a model of an ideal society which 
has been established by the genuine principles of Qur'an. On his 
opinion, Islam which Qur'an aims to reach is an effort to get a social 
system that morality and virtue dominating, and the principles of 
justice and equity are valid, and everything is being conducted for 
the benefıt of the society. Thus, one may say that in Özal's view, the 
moral values of Islam brings a notian of solidarity. His observance on 
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the uniJYing role of Islam is supplemented by the statement made 
about the totality of Islam: "As far as I read Qur'an, there are several 
subjects related to life, way of life, individual matters and the society 
that is why Islam is at the same time a way of life" (Özal, 1993b: 
232). 
Moreover, Özal (Zaman, 6 June, 1992) articulates the idea 
that Islam brings a notion of equity knowing that everybody is equal 
in front of God when they worship. He studies the evolution of social 
groups and sociology of religion and concludes that with the 
renovation and modemization of religion, it may contribute to the 
integrity of political and social system. In that respect, one may 
conclude that religion provides, in Özal's mind, a collective ideology 
that keeps people together (Ulagay, 1988: 125). Apart from this role 
of religion, it may also encourage "an organic indigenous 
development" with a minimum of simple but essential principles and 
rules (1991a: 296). 
Özal (1989: 46) argues that: "The Turkish state is secular but 
it is, in fact, Islam which holds people together, which serves in our 
etemal unity in a most strong way. As the Holy Book says 'do not get 
divided, do not get fragmented, hold onto God's robe in a tight 
manner'." Özal ( 1985: 7 4 7} keeps emphasizing the importance of 
religion as a basis of culture within each civilization. Religion 
influences deeply the individual and the society and even shapes 
them. In his view, the Turkish society has been affected by some 
histoncal developments in which religion has played an important 
role, making a reference to the Islamic concept of Tevhid 
80 
(monotheism). Özal (1985: 749) voices his idea on unifying function 
of Tevhid as follows: 
The concept of Tevhid in Islam has been an effort 
towards achieving the unity of society. There has 
been an attempt within this aim, to transform 
different parts of society into a balanced whole. 
The best example of this is the Ottoman Empire 
in which different nations, religions and parts of 
society lived together, performing their own 
functions and thus contributing to the balance, 
development and unity of society. 
It is interesting, however, that Özal (1985: 748) relates 
Islamic concept of order, Tevhid in which everything has a place and 
function to perform in organic relations within the framework of few 
but essential rules, to a free market. In his opinion, the organic 
relations means taday a market which functions properly with its 
free forces and main rules. In a market which Islam proposes, there 
is no direct intervention, instead, indirect incentives which take 
place. State only within this framework, keeps the rights of 
administration and distribution. Özal (1985: 748) goes on comparing 
the Islamic and Westem concepts of market in the fallawing way: 
There has always been same similarities between 
Islamic and Westem concepts of market. Above 
all, both of them is free and prices are set by 
means of market forces. Even competition, in an 
Islamic market mechanism, is better from the 
respect of putting same structural obstacles to 
the emergence of monopolies. Because of the 
moral considerations, competition in an Islamic 
market is not so much ruthless as in the Western 
market. 
Stemming from this Islamic intellectual understanding, Özal 
(1985: 749) talks about his govemments innovations inspired from 
religion, putting a stress on the uniqueness of Islamic finance and 
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investment which based on profit and loss sharing. Needless to say, 
Özal's government allowed the interest-free financial corporations. In 
fact, Özal had been veıy interested in the relationship between 
religion and economy from the days of his DPT (State Planning 
Organization) under secretaıy. Once, he asked one of planning 
experts whether religion can be employed as an element of planning 
(Çölaşan, 1992: 37) (5). 
The religious influence upon Özal directed him to form some 
public policies such as the establishment of the Fund of Social Aid 
and Solidarity (Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Fonu) derived 
from the book "So me Advices from Hz. Ali to Statesmen." What is 
mu ch more significant is his belief that what they, as the Motherland 
Party governments, had done are not contradictoıy with the 
principles of Islam (Özal, 1989: 374) (6). Özal had employed some 
religious arguments to legitimize his economic decisions. In one of 
his speeches, Özal (quoted in Ulagay, 1988: 59) redtes the words of 
the Prophet when he tries to refute the criticism about the rise of 
prices and defends liberalization policies of the government by 
making a quotation from the Prophet: " 'The control of prices are not 
under our discretion, that is the act of God. I cannot give any body's 
right to an other one, leave them free.' The Prophet told these word s 
when some people wanted him to set fıxed prices on commodities." 
Özal's utilization of Islam to legitimize free market leads him to 
conclude that there are some issues in Islam may change over time 
as for instance economic matters. According to him (1993b: 232), 
new developments should modify some economic principles of Islam 
as in the case of interest (faiz). Özal differentiates interest and riba, 
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and calls MusJim scholars to make new interpretations about that 
subject, thatisa need for reformation. Özal (l99la: 296) comes to a 
conclusion that :"The religion is developing. We earnestly hope that it 
will continue to develop. But we have no need of a reformer, the life 
of society will take care of its reformation." \Vhat is striking to note 
that Özal employs religious themes or verses from Qur'an, not to 
fight with religious fundamentalism but to make decisions related to 
governmental affairs, to develop counter arguments against the 
opposition. 
Although Özal had been criticized for his effort to develop 
close ties with other Islamic countries, his enthusiasm to maintain 
the best of relations with these countries should be seen as the 
continuation of the military government (1980-83) foreign policies. Of 
course Özal's aim is not only devdoping economic and commercial 
relations but also promoting same comman political goals especially 
for the Middle East. In his effort to transform ECO (Economic 
Cooperation Organization) with the acceptation of the Turkish 
Republics into a regional economic black, is not contradictory with 
his commitment to join Turkey to the EC. Turkey is in the unique 
position of being the only Muslim country to be part of the political 
economic and security institutions of the western world while being 
the only NATO member participating fully in the organization of the 
Islamic countries. Its cultural heritage is mainly rooted in the East 
but it had always turned toward the West. Özal underlies (l989c: 
109) the idea that Turkeyisa bridge between East and West through 
its synthesis of different cultures, not only in geographical, but also 
in moral and intellectual terms. Thus, the Turkish Republic, with its 
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pluralistic democracy, secular state and a free market economy is 
not only a model for the other countries but with all its historic 
experience is also a moderating factor in the region. Özal further 
argues that Turkey's membership to the EC, with its stand as a 
model for other Islamic countries, will make it possible for the EC to 
establish better relations \Vith the Islamic world. Turkey, today, views 
herself as an integral part of the West and her membership to the 
NATO, the Council of Europe and the OECD reflects this 
alignment.(Özal, 199lc: 1 12) 
Özal does not consider the Islamic Republic of Iran as a 
threat to the secular nature of Turkey and does not accept that Iran 
lend a support to the extreme religious groups and to those who 
killed Aksoy, Mumcu, Emeç, and other secular intellectuals. He also 
says during a speech to the American Enterprise Institute that he did 
not believe Iran posed a great threat internationally.(Özal, 1989c: 
105) Even Özal (Hürriyet 4 Feb, 1993) says during a speech to the 
Brooking Institute in Washington, the daim that Iran supports 
radical elements is an invention of the MIT (Turkish Intelligence 
Organization) 
According to Özal (1985: 748), Islam makes a great 
contribution, 
individualism 
during its emergence, to the development of 
which is an essential element of Özal's system of 
thought. Özal's understanding of religion as one of the bases for his 
liberalism, i.e. emphasis on individualism and minimization of state, 
keeping in mind the free fundamental freedoms, seems to be parallel 
with the "civil religion" of American liberalism, it is almost needless 
to mention the influence of the American system upon Özal (7). 
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The liberal civil religion in the U .S., according to Gany (1992: 
129), emphasizes social responsibilities to promote freedom, peace 
and justice and speaks more of human rights and of what will 
benefıt humanity. It harmonizes religious values with democratic 
political values that recognize and tolerate the diversity of the 
religious sects and moral teachings. The concept of civil religion 
refers to the political recognition of the influence and tradition of 
religion in America's public life. Liberal use of religion aims at 
inspiring the ideals of justice and fairness and at providing people 
with a sense of comfort and a sense of communal identifıcation, 
while the conservative religious tendeney fuels a passionate 
resentment toward change and modernity. Liberals, unlike 
conservatives who command that a particular set of private moral 
beliefs be imposed upon the public through the political process, 
form political beliefs by asking what religious values apply to the 
political world. In addition to religious and civic values and the ideals 
of freedom and democracy, American liberalism recognizes and 
encourages community values (supportive and cooperative 
community) alongside individualism (Garry, 1992: 130). 
Özal's belief in individual and his emphasis on the three 
fundamental freedoms and democracy lies well \vithin the liberal 
understanding. His belief in change and in optimism for the future 
also reflects a liberal commitment to build the future. Conservatism 
as one element of Özal's formulation (conservatism-nationalism and 
social justice) may be seen as an effort to promote community values 
i.e. the unity, cooperation alongside his individualism. Özal values 
change with the belief in the freedom and the power of the individual, 
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gathering his ideas un der the titles of "New Outlook" in ı 979 and 
"The Second Transformatian Program" in ı 992; one may thus 
conclude that in spite of his emphasis and encouragement for some 
conservative values and institutions such as family, respect for 
people, social order, Özal seerus to be liberal rather than 
conservative. Moreover his utilization of religious values as political 
values of Turkish public life through same selective public policies as 
in the cases of education, social aid and economic issues, reflects the 
main characteristics of the American liberal concept of civil religion. 
Unlike conservatives, Özal's commitment to change and his selective 
application of the religious values to the Turkish political world 
constitute other examples of his liberal conceptualization of civil 
religion. Özal's consideration of reformation in religion may be 
understood v.ithin his liberal civil religion concept: "The life of society 
[social change] will take care of the reformation of religion." Similarly, 
Özal tolerates religious orders and communities and is in favor of 
giving legal status to the religious communities as an element of the 
civil society. (Özdemir, 1993: 20) His attitude towards religious 
orders is the best example of his liberal approach. 
3.3.1 Religious Orders 
Özal was criticized by some circles, ranging from Evren to 
intellectuals and journalists on the basis that he made concessions 
to fundamentalist groups and created suitable grounds for 
strengthening religious communities and orders. According to 
memoirs of Evren, prime minister Özal in his fırst days of 
government, requested changing the status of the Presideney of the 
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Religious Affairs and putting an end to the impıisonment of Raşid 
Erol, one of the sheikhs of Nakshibendi order. Regarding Özal's ties 
to religious communities during his life and his visits to the tombs 
and convents (dergah) which had a legitimizing effect on the 
existence and the role of religious orders, one may say that Özal is 
in favor of enforcing the role of religious orders (folk Islam) politically 
and socially. In fact, Özal's life had been connected to the religious 
groups since his university education. He kissed the hands of 
Mehmet Zahid Kotku, one of the sheikhs of the Nakshibendi order, 
for several times to show his respect. Özal's mother, Hafıze Özal was 
buried beside Kotku upon the decision of the Council of the 
Ministers. 
What is more stıiking that Özal regards sufısm (tasavvufJ as 
a basis for the creation of the universalism, humanism and tolerance 
in Turkish society. The concept of the brotherhood of the mankind, a 
product of the Turkish sufısm is perceived by Özal as the ground in 
which tolerance and a new synthesis may flourish in Turkish society. 
Making an illuminating statement about the formation of the 
Motherland Party: " I have established the Motherland Party 
according to the philosophy of Mevlana." One may think that, in 
Özal's mind Turkish sufısm represented by Mevlana and Yunus 
Emre, may provide suitable grounds for seculaıized Islam and 
freedom of conscience and religion by making a quotation from 
Atatürk:" I had opened the tomb of Mevlana [after one year from the 
dosing of all tombs and convents] as a museum (Asaıi Atika 
Museum) because I believe that whoever visits Mevlana will be saved 
from religious reactionism and will be on the side of the revolution 
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(Turkish Revolution I and of freedoru of religion and conscience" (Özal, 
1989b: 4 ). Özal seems to be engaged in supporting religious orders 
and communities in Central Asia and in the Balkans to keep and 
promote Turkish Republic's interests through these orders activities 
(Zaman ,22 April, 1993). Özal's support to the religious orders, it 
may be argued, has some parallels to Abdulhamit II's utilization of 
religious orders for state interests. 
In addition, in Özal's view, contrary to the claims made by 
media, the murders of Aksoy, Mumcu and others have nothing to do 
with religious circles by stating that:" I do not believe that Turkey's 
extreme religious circles had opted for armed attacks. It looks more 
like a provocation, there is the involvement of the professional men" 
(Briefing, 12 Februaıy, 1990). 
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NOTES 
(1) On the subject of legal structuıing, 1982 Constitution on the 
political parties, law, see Turan, "Political Parties and the Party 
System in post-1983 Turkey", in Heper and Evin (eds), State, 
Denıocracy and the Militaıy Turkey in the 1980s, New York and 
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988 p. 68-75 and \Villiam Hale, 
Transition to Civilian in Turkey: the Militmy perspective, 1988 p. 
159-175. 
(2) It should be added that Özal regards the Derncerat Party as the 
real "People's Party" putting a stress on the achievements of the 
Democrats in the 1950s, in devdopmental affairs (Özal, 1989a: 327). 
(3) Vehbi Dinçerler's efforts to islamicize education is in conformity 
\:Vith Özal's views on the subject. Özal pays attention to the 
importance of Jslamic training in national education (İslami Terb~ye) 
(1993a: 16) 
(4) Even the SDPP, in its motion to investigate fundamentalism and 
their relationship with the govemment, claimed that infıltration of 
the Inteıior Ministry by religious personal aimed at establishing a 
special armed force of some 110.000 people. 
(5) Çölaşan claims that Özal held meetings with some experts in his 
room when he was an undersecretary of DPT, talked about the 
Prophet and Hz. Ali, read some verses from Qur'an and Hadiths as 
well. 
(6) His religious considerations in making decision related to 
governmental affairs is evidently clear in his disturbance from 
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Korkut Özal's statement that KDV (value added taxes) is not Jslamic 
(Milliyet, 27 June, 1994). 
(7) Özal, in one of his visitings to the United States, says that "I have 
done in Turkey what I have seen in the United States." 
(8) Özal also wanted himself to be buried besides Mehmed Zahid 
Kotku in his testament before his by-pass heart operation in 
February 1987, but he changed his testament to the place where he 
was buried in April 1993 in the opposite side of the Monument of 
Menderes. (Milliyet, 5 July 1994). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CONCLUSION 
Secularization has been essentially a cumulative process in Turkey. 
In the Ottoman Empire, even when Islamic influences reached their 
apogee during the sh.'teenth century, the state was far from being a 
truly Islamic one. As Heper (1981: 348) points out, "institutional 
secularization as differentiation" i. e. giving religion a definite, though 
by no means a minor place in the social scene also existed in the 
Ottoman polity. Ottoman reformists (küttab, bureucrats) introduced 
secularization policies through the adab institution which is the 
secular principle of the Ottoman state. It was as early as the 
nineteenth century that the idea that life can be lived in accordance 
with rationality rather than religious rules, began to take shape. And 
Iater the Young Turks, drawing upon Gökalp's ideas, developed a 
canception of nationalism that brought with it a secular image of 
government and introduced some reforms which constituted 
preliminary steps for the Kemalist secularism. Ottoman secularism 
was in the directian of bifurcation of religion and state, not 
separation of religion and state. The Kemalist reformers considered 
this dualistic structure of the Ottoman times as unworkable and 
preferred the way of modernizing the country without making use of 
religion. For Kemalists Islam was not supposed to have even the 
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function of a "civil religion" for the Turkish polity. Islam was not 
going to provide a transcendent goal for the political life (Heper, 
1981: 350). 
The secularization process in its various dimensions started 
during the Ottoman era and gained further momenturu under the 
Republic. Donald Smith (quoted in Turan, 1991: 33) has identified 
five types of secularization process which can be experienced. Four of 
these had been taking place during last two centuries of the Ottoman 
Empire. These are : 
(1) polity separation secularization, meaning the institutional 
separation of religion and polity and the denial of the religious 
identity; (2) polity expansion secularization, meaning the expansion 
of the political system into areas of society formerly regulated by 
religion; (3) political culture secularization, meaning the 
transformatian of values associated with the polity and replacing of 
religious by secular nations of politics, political community and 
political legitimacy; (4) political process secularization, meaning the 
decline in the political saliency of religious leaders, interest groups 
and issues. The fifth polity daminance secularization, that is the 
initiation of an open governmental attack on the religious basis of 
general culture, constitutes the essence of Kemalist reforms (Turan, 
1991: 33}. During the 1930s, the Kemalists tried to nationalize Islam 
as a part of the imposition of secular ideology and at the same time 
controlled it through creating a religious organization within the 
s ta te as a min or bureaucracy. 
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Transition to multiparty politics inevitably brought about a 
moderation in the understanding of secularism in Turkey. The 
confines of religious freedom were expanded and Islam was this time 
politicized. Religious liberalization, as a natural consequence of 
democratic politics were introduced by the Republicans and further 
its scope broadened provided that state institutions were not 
affected. As a related development to the moderation of secularism, 
Turkish polity has v.ritnessed a revival of religion as a political input. 
Religious groups have started to influence the governmental affairs in 
order to attain the benefits of their political mobilization by the 
Democrats. Clientelistic relations between the Islamic circles and the 
Democrats resulted in the emergence of a conservative-religious axis 
which later gave a birth to a religious party, the NSP. Islam no longer 
was a solely a matter of individual concern, it was a political factor 
that should have a considerable influence on the political arena, 
performing a function of checks and balance (denetim}. One of the 
factors leading to the 1960 Intervention was the utilization of religion 
by the Democrats for electoral considerations. The makers of the 
1961 Constitution adopted an understanding of more rights with 
more sanctions against their misuse or abuse. The emergence of the 
NSP, a religious party indicated a further legitimating of the role of 
religion in politics. The NSP's rejection of the identification of 
modernization with Westernization and its search for a new (lslamic) 
model of modernity represented an emergence of new elites with 
Islamic background. When the military as the sole guardian of the 
Republic came to power in 1980 with the aim of reestablishing 
democracy and the strengthening the state, religion was considered 
as contributing to solidarity and national unity. The military's 
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attitude towards religion was pragmatic to the extent that it did not 
hesitate to employ religion as a source of ethics and culture and an 
antidote to the leftist ideologies. The military regime's utilization of 
religion for the politicization of society has been accompanied with an 
emergence of "a Durkheimian version of religiosity" (Heper, 1981: 
359) (1 ). Such religiosity has been reinforced by liberal and pluralist 
policies of the motherland party which combined four tendendes 
namely conservatists, liberals and nationalists, reflecting a new 
evolving synthesis on Özal's personality. 
As a parallel development to the changing nature of 
secularism, the role of religion in Turkey's political development has 
also changed significantly since the Ottoman times. Toprak's study of 
Islam and Political Development (1981: 123-124) demonstrates the 
vaıying functions of the religion. In the Ottoman period Islam defined 
individual identity and political legitimacy, and functioned as a 
mechanism of social control. During the next phase of Turkey's 
political development, namely its transition from an empire into a 
nation-state, Islam provided a source of national unity against 
invading powers. Mter the establishment of the Republic in 1923, 
religion became a means of protest against the authoritarian one 
party regime. In the transition from one party rule to democracy, 
Islam served as a means of mass political mobilization in the hands 
of a newly established opposition party which sought to gain a 
fooiliold in electoral politics through politicizing the religious 
dimension of the long-standing elite-mass gap. During the 1960s and 
1970s religion assumed a less central role in political polarization as 
the left-right cleavage became a major source of conflict in Turkey's 
94 
society. (Toprak, 1981: 124) Finally, one may suggest in the 1980s 
and I 990s with the dedin e of ideologies, religion has again assumed 
a more central role in democratization process (head scaıves, turban 
movement and the growing influence of a pro-Islamic party, Welfare 
Party) and political polarization, creating a secular-non secular 
cleavage. 
The changing role of religion in 1 980s to ok place \vi thin a 
region in which Islaınic resurgence appear as an ideology with the 
Islamic revolution of Iran. Regarding this growing visibility of Muslim 
revival, it is not necessary to reiterate that Islam has assumed 
influential roles in national policies, actually Evren and Özal's 
utilization of religion for some political and even secular policies, as 
discussed in Chapter II and III is a strong evidence for this 
observation. 
Up to that point, I have tried to summarize the stoıy of 
Turkish experience with secularism and its changing nature in order 
to get a histoncal perspective when I compare and contrast the 
positions of Evren and Özal on the subject of secularism. In the 
following pages, I discuss their understandings of secularism under 
three subheadings: the notion of secularism, religion and its 
reformation and religious groups. 
Before starting to fınd similarities and dissimilarities between 
Evren and Özal's views on secularism, it should be noted that Ziya 
Gökalp's system of thought has a signifıcant impact on their 
interpretation of religion and its role in Turkish society. As Parla 
(1985: 7) perceptively observed, Gökalp's corporatist thinking (2) has 
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provided the paradigmatic world view for the several dominant 
political ideologies in Turkey and that more specifically Unionism 
(1908-1918) and Kemalism ( 1923-1950) as singular official 
ideologies, as well as contemporary Kemalisms (1960-1980) are but 
programmatic and, in the narrow sense, ideologkal variations of 
Gökalp's inclusive system. He further contends that the Kemalism of 
the armed forces is a variant of Gökalp's corporatism. The ideologkal 
positions of the right-wing parties, DP-AP-ANAP, have also been 
influenced from Gökalp's corporatism via Kemalism. 
For Gökalp, corporatism as the solidaristic perception of 
society serves a philosophical model of society, and the ideology is 
social solidarism (içtimai meflrurecilik}. The Kemalist principle of 
populism was heavily influenced by Gökalp's social solidarism. The 
Kemalists saw themselves as the leaders of the people in a society 
without a developed class structure. To them "people" implied the 
coalescing of the various social forces against the old order. The 
principle task was therefore not merely to destroy the old society but 
to collaborate in the creation of a new one. Both tasks require total 
cohesion and unity among all the groups who made up the people 
and there was no room for a conflict of interest among them. Even 
one may link the Kemalist solidaristic perception of society which 
coalesced without any privileges and classes, to the ideological 
nature of Islam in which Umma is considered a coalescent unity and 
eveıybody is equal in front of God. (Mardin, 1992b: 101) In that 
respect, the republic provided the continuation of Umma structure. 
Patriotism, sense of unity and cooperation which given in the schools 
are not far from the old notion of Umma. The comparisons and 
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contrasts below are therefore taken Vv1thin the conte.A"t of Atatürk's 
ideas on the subject and Gökalp's corporatist understanding of 
religion. 
4.1 The notion of Secularism 
The distinction between Turkish political elite and state elite would 
be a key to explain the major differences between Evren and Özal's 
conceptualization of secularism. As Heper (1987: 53) states, the state 
elites are always suspicious of the political elites, in the eyes of the 
former, if left to their own devices, the latter would de stabilize the 
system because they are pre-occupied Vvith particularistic interests. 
The political elites tend to have a protest orientation toward the state 
elites. So the political elites often tıy to challenge the system. The 
confrontation between state and political elites responded to the 
degeneration of the political system in three times (the 1960, 1971 
and 1980 interventions). 
What is more crucial to use here is the differing conceptions 
of democracy exposed by state and political elites. The state elites 
traditionally comprising military offıcers, senior govemıneni offıcers, 
long tended to conceive of democracy vertically, seeing it asa matter 
of political responsibility whereas the political elites saw themselves 
as the people's representatives and placed heavy emphasis on the 
horizontal character of democracy as political participation (Heper, 
1992: 106) (3). Looked at from this particular perspective, Evrenasa 
leader of militaıy intervention of 1980 and later President (as a 
member of state elites), considers secularism as the guarantee of 
democratic regime against the possible social and political 
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movements. But Özal regards secularism as the guarantee of 
freedoms and liberalization policies toward religious groups, which 
are the natural results of democracy and political responsiveness of 
political elite. 
For Evren, like the Kemalist reformers, secularism is strongly 
connected to the ideal of modernization and the aim of reaching at 
the level of Western civilization. Secularism constitutes a modern 
way to be developed and civilized. Secularism is not only a guarantee 
of the religious freedom and conscience but also it protects Turkish 
national unity and democratic regime from the religious reactionaıy 
movements. But Özal put an emphasis on the freedoru side of 
secularism and on the protection of the rights of pious Muslims as in 
the case of veiled women students. 
Moreover, Özal makes a distinction between Westernization 
and modernization. In his view, Westernization means resemblance 
in culture, art, way of life and technology to a Western notion, but 
modernization is with the example of Japan, a nation's living with its 
spirit. Özal seerus to have borrowed his distinction of culture which 
is national whereas technology and science (civilization) is 
international, from Gökalp's formulation (Turkish Culture and 
Westem Civilizations). Gökalp (1968b: 22-39) argues that just as 
cultural differences do not prevent the sharing of a religion, so a 
difference of culture and religion does not prevent the sharing of 
civilization. Culture is national whereas civilization is international. 
For Gökalp, there is no inherent contradiction between culture and 
civilization or between nationalism (Turkism), religious community 
(Islam) and international community (modemism-Westernism). They 
98 
are in no way incompatible as ideals worth preserving, provided that 
their function, place and level in national life are not confused. 
In Özal's liberal policies toward religion and religious groups, 
his emphasis on the concept of servant state, and on the reduction of 
state involvement in religious issues are the outcomes of political 
elite attitude. Even Özal further criticizes radical secularization of the 
Republic leading to deifıcation of state by attributing to its divine 
characteristics and underlies the religious revivalism as a liberating 
force, putting an end to the deification of state. In that respect, Özal, 
both as a Prime Minister and President, tries to change the rule of 
the game and challenge Kemalist understanding of secularism. 
Although both Evren and Özal seem committed to the 
principle of Kemalist secu]arism, to be noted the fact that Öza1's 
interpretation of secularism is open to redefıning secularism and 
reestablishing the relationship between state and religion. Unlike 
Kemalist secularism and Evren's interpretation, Özal argues to leave 
religious matters and the administration of the Presideney of 
Religious Affairs to the religious communities. Such interpretation of 
secularism is a radical departure from the Kemalist secularism. 
Stemming from the fact that there is no distinction between religion 
and state in Islam, according to the Kemalist reformers, in Turkish 
context, secularism means putting an end to the damination of 
religious authority over all areas of life, except spiritual matters and 
making religion subservient to the state. Thus they never think of an 
independent religious organization like a Western church which is 
presided by a spiritual authority. 
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Özal's interpretation of secularism appears to be in parallel 
with Gökalp who tries to give religion a position of a separate, moral 
and cultural institution. Such a religious organization which 
resembled in structure to Roman Catholic Church, did not, however, 
in any way intersect with the secular political institutions of the 
nation. Such an "ethical corporation" represented solely a spiritual 
authority. He envisions a religious organization on the national scale 
ranging from local mosques headed by imams to large mosques 
headed by müftüs, to a national office of head-müftü as the highest 
religious authority. Gökalp (1968b: 125) suggests that the head 
müftüs of all islamic nations would select a caliph as the head of the 
entire Islamic community of nations. Such a religious organization is 
a clear institutional separation of religion and state. Moreover, 
Gökalp asserts that ,in accordance with the pluralism of his 
solidaristic corporatism [is coined by Parla (1985: 39)], political and 
religious authorities as distinct social units would be mutually 
autonomous. Such a canception led Gökalp to recommend the 
elimination of the office of the Sheyhulislam (the supreme Muftı) 
from the structure of the secularized state. It means for the 
contemporary Turkey a separation of religious organization (the 
Presideney of Religious Affairs) from the structure of. the secular 
state. Similarly Özal is in favor of separating the religious 
organization from the state structure but Evren, one may argue that, 
would consider such a separation as a dangerous development and a 
violation of the Kemalist und erstanding of secularism. 
On the subject of the Kemalist reforms, Evren as a state elite 
embraces and defends Kemalist reforms by putting a blame on the 
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political elite as in the case of the changing of the call to prayer while 
Özal is critica! about, at least, some secular reforms taken under the 
principle of secularism. For instance, he argues that the adoption of 
secularism represented a clear break with the Islamic past and 
(further) some secular reforms brought "cultural impoverishment" 
such as the language reform. Thus "the erisis of identity" has been 
exacerbated by the rejection of the historic component of culture, 
namely the language. In short, one may claim that Evren has the 
visian of protecting the Turkish Republic and understands 
secularism within this framework (a military perception as a state 
elite) whereas Özal, as a political elite, has a visian of transforming 
the system and making even some radical reforms (second 
transformatian program) through liberalization policies that will end 
the deification of state. 
Naturally, Evren and Özal's different interpretations of 
secularism come from their interpretation of Islam and its place in 
the society. 
4.2 Religion and its Reformation 
Religion and politics are a closely integrated unity in Islam and not 
two separate spheres of life. Islamic theology encourages an 
involvement in political activitiesasa religious duty. Therefore, each 
member of the Islamic community is both a religious and a political 
man. Islam, from the very beginning has been a political religion 
which has both united and governed the community of believers and 
a legalistic religion which has laid down a series of legal rules. The 
unity of divine and worldly realms in Islam implies a unity of religion 
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and politics; that is why, in Jslamic societies the impact of reli~ion on 
social and political life is extensive since the boundaries between the 
religious sphere and the socio-political sphere are either non-existent 
or weak. Stemming from this peculiar nature of Islam, each 
conceptualization of secularism determines different roles for religion 
in Turkish socio-political life. 
Both Evren and Özal consider religion as a source of moral 
values and an instrument of solidarity, unity and coherence to get a 
peacefully ordered and stable society. Such acceptance of religion 
which draws an attention to its solidarity function is an inheritance 
derived from Gökalp's solidarism. Gökalp (1972: 34) argues that 
religion provides a type of morality and social solidarity. This 
solidarity function of religion, of course, is veıy practical for the 
purposes of the September 12th regime under Evren to reestablish 
democracy in a deliberately depoliticised society. We may conclude 
that unlike Kemalist secularism of the RPP (1923-1950), for E-vTen 
and Özal, Islam is supposed to have the function of a "civil religion" 
for the Turkish polity. Both Özal and Evren liked to narrate verses 
from Qur'an as a point of reference in an attempt to justi:ty their 
secular policies and to exploit an integrative function of Islam. 
But it should be added that Özal's scope for the 
conceptualization of civil religion, liberal concept of civil religion is 
much more broader than Evren's one. Özal harmonizes religious 
values with demecratic political values in an attempt to reach at a 
new synthesis for Turkish society. Özal's liberal concept of civil 
religion aims to save the individual from the divine characteristics of 
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the state if "Mustafa Kemal's secularism tried to free the individual 
from the society" (Mardin, 1992a : 71 ). 
It would be correct to say that their use of Islam to get social 
harmonizatian and solidarity \vithin Turkish society contradicts with 
Kemalist interpretation of secularism. In fact. it is impossible to 
think that Mustafa Kemal approves the use of religion as an 
instrument. On the contraıy, the main theme on Kemalist political 
agenda was the replacement of religion by science to perform the 
social functions of religion. Mustafa Kemal's attempt to settle natural 
laws as the basic philosophy of the Turkish Republic is a strong 
evidence that he perceives science as a "civil religion" (uygar din) 
(Mardin, 1990: 199). 
Evren and Özal differentiate true Islam which is necessary to 
construct a just and equal society and Islamic fundamentalism. Both 
seemed to agree that the underdevelopment of the Islamic countries 
does not stern from the veıy principles of Islam but of 
misinterpretation of it. Both seem also to believe that Islam and 
modemity do not necessarily contradict, do necessarily not oppose 
one another. This assumption is followed by an effort of going back 
to the original texts, namely to Qur'an and the tradition of Prophet in 
order to have a purified, but at the same time rationalized Islam. The 
notion that Islam and modemity are not contradictoıy but 
complementaıy of each other lies \vithin the intellectual framework of 
the Ottoman times. The two prominent movements of the Ottoman, i. 
e. that of Iate Turkism and of Islamism put forth simHar arguments 
though differing their emphasis on the role of religion. For instance 
Gökalp also argues that Islam is not contraıy to modem state but, 
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on the contraıy, the Islamic state means a modern state (Gökalp, 
1968a: 222) (3). 
In order to attain a purified and rationalized Islam, Evren 
points up the urgent need for reformation of religion. Although Özal 
accepts such a need for reformation in religion, he takes that in the 
sense of renovation {içtihad). On the other hand, Evren's view on 
reformation goes even further, defending the change of the call to 
prayer from Arabic to Turkish. This understanding of reformation is 
similar to Atatürk's attempt to make a rational and national 
(Western-like) religion as it is seenin the case of the "turkifıcation" of 
Qur'an and the call toprayer (4). 
Similarly, Gökalp (1968b: 120) claims that in order to give a 
greater rapture and exhilliation to our religious life, it is necessary 
that Qur'an and the religious services be read in Turkish referring to 
the ideas of Imam-i Azam, the founder of Hanefi law school. In fact, 
the forerunner of reformation in religion is Gökalp as it is clear in 
one of his (1976: ll; Lewis, 1961: 415) poems: 
A land where the call to prayer from the mosque 
is recited in Turkish 
where the peasant understands the meaning of 
the prayer in his worship, 
A land where in the schools The Qur'an is read in 
Turkish, 
Where, big and little, everyone knows the 
command of Gad, 
This, O son of the Turks, is your fatherland. 
The idea of reformation and rationalization of religion is 
included Gökalp's system of thought. Gökalp regards Islam as a 
histarical phenomenon subject to change and dependent on the 
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social circumstances in which it is deveJoped. He alsa seeks a 
rational expJanation for the religious rules and ceremonies. 
\Vhile Evren proposes hisideason the reformation of religion 
to undermine the influence of religious fundamentalist arguments 
directed to the nature of the regime and to justi:ty secular policies of 
the Republic, Özal presenis the renovation and moden1ization of 
religion to promote an organic indigenous development. According to 
Özal, a modemized Islam would be a drive-force of social 
transformatian and economic development. Özal's approach is a bit 
paraHel to the reformisi Muslim thinkers such as Malıarnmed Abduh 
and İkbal and sametimes his perplexed mind on the idea of 
renovation reflects intellectual considerations of an islamist 
individual in the modem world. 
4.3 Religious Orders 
In the Ottoman Empire, popular religion which was institutionalized 
in the form of religious orders had rendered the services of colonizing 
and settling many parts of the empire. But at the same time, they are 
commonly identified as centers of opposition to the orthodox religion 
of the state and the ulema. At the end of the nineteenth century 
religious orders were used by Sultan Abdulhamit II as 
communicative channels to reach masses, to promote Pan-lslamist 
view among his Muslim subjects. Although religious orders had 
rallied to the support of the War of lndependence, the Kemalist 
reformists abolished the religious orders in ı 925. The orders w ere 
considered as the centers that the most dangerous resistance to 
secularism would come. In ı 925, a re bellion I ed by a N akshibendi 
ıo5 
sheikh surfaced in Easten1 Anatolia and again in the Menemen 
incident of ı 930, a shadowy N akshibendi fıgure called muslims to 
rally round the green flag and destroy the impious republican 
regime. In spite of their abolishment, the religious orders had never 
died but had gone underground. \Vith the liberalization of religious 
policies in the Iate ı 940s, religious orders reappeared and showed 
increased activity after the 1950s. 
Religious orders have been involved in politics in a way that 
they have supported the right -wing parties in exchange for some 
religious policies such as turning the call to prayer into Arabic. 
Today, the Nakshibendi order daminates both the grassroots and the 
national leadership of the \Velfare Party, as it did in the case of the 
National Salvation Party. Mehmed Zahid Kotku, a Nakshibendi 
sheikh, gathered a circle of persons around him who later, in the 
ı 970s and ı 980s, played a key role in politics. Among them we may 
mention Necmettin Erbakan, Korkut Özal and Turgut Özal. The role 
of religious orders in politics has been a veıy controversial .issue in 
the secular republic ofTurkey. 
The most striking difference between Evren and Özal's 
interpretation of secularism is evidently seen in their attitude 
towards religious communities and orders. Although Evren modifıes 
the previous strict stand on secularism, his interpretation of 
secularism does not include the right of establishing a religious 
organization and involvement in politics, considering them 
obscurantist and illegitimate. On the one hand he employs religion 
as an instrument of solidarity and national unity, on the other, he 
shares, under the influence of Iranian revolution, the fear of the 
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J{emalist reformers that Islam, ina Muslim countıy, may constitute a 
counterrevolutionary ideology to destroy the regime. But Özal does 
not conceive religious communities and orders as reactionary and 
illegitimate but integral elements of a civil society, and when he 
attacks on Islamic fundamentalism, unlike Evren, he does not 
address to religious orders, Suleymancies, Nurcus and so on. Özal, 
further, is in favor of strengthening the religious orders and 
communities to realize the Turkish state's interesis in Central Asia. 
as a foreign policy element similar to Abdulhamit Il's strategy. 
Moreover, Evren equates religious communities with religious 
obscurantism which is responsible for the backwardness of the 
Ottoman Empire. Under the influence of republican diehatamy 
"ilerici" and "gerici", he considers religious fundamentalism much 
more dangerous than communism. It is interesting to note that 
Gökalp (1968b: 61) alsa underlies the similar idea that theocratic 
and derical movements are the principal reason why Muslim 
societies remain backward and even gradually retrogress. While 
Turkish nationalism is a cultural-normative system for Gökalp, 
Islamic religion is an ethical-normative system, both of supplying 
the basis of solidarity in the society. Gökalp is interested in the social 
function of Islam, not its theology. Gökalp put a stress on Sufism as 
a prop for solidari sm. The principle of the communion of the self with 
a transcendental Gad in Sufism easily fitted into the primacy of 
society over the individual in the solidaristic corporatist model. For 
Özal, Turkish Sufism serves for the creation of universalism, 
tolerance and solidarity for Turkish society. In Özal's view, religious 
orders does not only provide a source of moral values but alsa they 
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do play a crucial role in an attempt to reach at a new synthesis for 
Turkish society. 
In sum, it would be correct to say that the 1980s and early 
1990s have witnessed a signifıcant change in the relationships 
between state and religion under Evren and Özal. The changing role 
of religion as a result of particular change in the state elites' attitude 
towards Islam, have been modifying the nature of Turkish 
secularism in a way that represents a departure from the pre-1980 
Kemalist secularism. Such a difference has been accompanied with a 
liberal and pluralist conceptualization of secularism by the political 
elites. Seen in this light, although secularism is stili an issue of 
conflict in Turkish polity, creating secular-non secular cleavage, one 
may suggest that, the Turkish secularism \Vill continue to be 
redefıned provided that the system keeps its commitment to 
democracy and civilian government. The growing political saliency of 
a religious party, the Welfare Party seems to be a challenging 
phenomenon on the issue of the relations between religion and state. 
The question now to ask is whether the relatively pluralist and liberal 
nature of Turkish system, the legacy of 1980s and early 1990s will 
evolve into a more liberal and democratic structure or not. Above all, 
it may be suggested that in the 1990s, the issue of secularism will 
continue to keep its importance and controversial nature. 
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NOTES 
{1) As Heper (1981: 350) points out, in this version, religion refers to 
a class of statements and actions denoting social relationships. As a 
result of the superior powers of the collectiv:ity, its cohesive force and 
moral authority, group-ritual aspects become important. 
(2) Corporatism is a system of thought and a set of institutions that 
presuppose a predominantly capitalist mode of production with its 
central elemenis of the primacy of the private property and 
enterprise. Corporatism is, by definition, anti-socialist and anti-
Marxist. It is also anti-liberal (in philosophy, politics and 
economics), but not anti-capitalist. For Gökalp, corporatism as the 
solidaristic perception of society as an analytic discipline also senred 
as a philosophical model of society. The system as a whole took the 
shape idealistic positivism: the method was scientific in the 
positivistic sense and the ideology was solidarism. Gökalp labeled it 
social solidarism (Içtiinai Mefkurecilik). (Parla, 1985 : 26) 
(3) Gökalp considers Protestantism as more or less Islamicized form 
of Christianity and the modern state came into existence in Europe 
first in the Protestant countries. (Gökalp, 1968b: 222) 
{4) It is true that state elites in the 1980 changed their attitude 
towards religion and softened Kemalist understanding of secularism, 
regarding Kemalism not as a political manifesto but as a technique. 
(Heper, 1985: 143) But the differing conceptualization of democracy 
and secularism by Turkish state and political elites is stili persisiing 
and striking in the case of religious groups- i. e. on the recruitment of 
army officers, veiled female students and so on. 
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